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SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE
Alina S. Ball
The social enterprise movement has ushered in a promising new wave 
of companies using market-based strategies to advance social and 
environmental change.  The longevity and growth of social enterprises will 
be determined by their ability to balance the complex and often competing 
interests within these unique business entities.  The established corporate 
governance regime, which predominately addresses the characteristics of 
public companies, does not provide adequate oversight for promoting good 
corporate governance within the social enterprise sector.  This Article 
argues that the benefit reporting requirements in hybrid-corporation statutes 
offer an innovative mechanism for encouraging and maintaining good 
social enterprise governance.  Using the benefit reporting requirements 
within hybrid-corporation statutes as a model, this Article provides a 
normative framework and establishes the implementation principles for 
social enterprise governance across various legal entities.  By counseling 
social enterprises on how to promote participatory democracy and increase 
the company’s capacity to detect and address problems, corporate lawyers 
serve a critical function in developing social enterprise governance.  Using 
an approach guided by corporate lawyers and informed by social enterprise 
practitioners would build on the traditional corporate governance paradigm 
to develop narrowly tailored mechanisms that facilitate a more resilient 
social enterprise sector. 
 Associate Professor of Law at UC Hastings College of the Law and Director of the Social 
Enterprise & Economic Empowerment (“SEEE”) Clinic.  For helpful comments on earlier 
drafts, I am grateful to Eric Guttschuss, Jennifer Fan, Jennifer Lee, Lynnise Pantin, Morris 
Ratner, Tracey Roberts, Manoj Viswanathan, William Wang, and participants in the Junior 
Faculty Workshop at UC Hastings College of the Law.  I also thank Jessica Allen, Raymond 
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INTRODUCTION
The social enterprise1 ethos of conducting business fundamentally 
alters the ways in which a company should be governed because it compels 
directors and officers to make corporate decisions that account for the 
divergent interests of the company’s stakeholders and to consider the 
decisions’ broader impact on society.2  Social enterprises are business 
ventures that intentionally affect societal good.  The sustainability of early-
stage social enterprises is particularly vulnerable because they rarely 
operate at a high profit margin.  As a result, the wrong executive decisions 
are more likely to end the business because there is little operating reserve 
to sustain the company’s recovery.  Moreover, social enterprises must 
constantly manage the conflicting interests of profit returns and social 
impact,3 which is hard to do. Thus, social enterprises need good corporate 
governance practices and enforcement mechanisms if the sector will 
thrive.4  Corporate governance describes the system of internal controls to 
regulate people, processes, and policies within an organization.  Social 
enterprises in the United States are subject to state and, where applicable, 
federal laws regarding corporate governance.  But there is an absence of 
regulatory oversight to enforce good governance models within the social 
enterprise sector because most social enterprises do not exceed the 
 1.  See infra Part I.A. 
 2.  J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and 
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2012) (discussing how 
directors are instructed to implement stakeholder governance, but are given no guidance 
about how accomplish that); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101 cmt. (B LAB Jan. 13, 
2016),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_2016.pd
f [https://perma.cc/DX3R-7G7X] (identifying benefit corporations as “a business that 
operates with a corporate purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value and that 
consciously undertakes a responsibility to maximize the benefits of its operations for all 
stakeholders, not just shareholders”); BRIDGES VENTURES LLP, TO B OR NOT TO B: AN
INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO B CORPS 12 (Sept. 2015), http://bridgesventures.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/To-B-or-Not-To-B-6-print.pdf [https://perma.cc/72FY-8H5A].  
 3.  Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into 
the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 633 (2009); Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 684 (2014) (“[E]ventually there 
will have to be decisions where profit and social good come into conflict and must be traded 
off.”).
 4.  See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 91 (2015) (hereinafter Social Enterprise as Commitment) (“One answer 
lies in developing governance processes and policies that internalize, express, and self-
regulate the social enterprise’s commitment to its social mission.”). 
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thresholds to initiate government monitoring.5  As a result, many social 
enterprises are in a netherworld of governance6 that has not been previously 
analyzed in social enterprise legal scholarship. 
The social enterprise sector is an increasingly growing segment of the 
U.S. economy.7  Impact investing8 in the social enterprise sector by 
institutional investment alone is estimated to be at $46 billion by 
conservative figures,9 which is a fraction of the estimated $6.20 trillion in 
U.S.-domiciled assets currently committed to socially responsible 
investing.10  When an industry crumbles, there are ripple effects far beyond 
the immediate companies’ balance sheets, as these events affect customers, 
 5.  Shruti Rana, Philanthropic Innovation and Creative Capitalism: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective on Social Entrepreneurship and Corporate Social Responsibility,
64 ALA. L. REV. 1121, 1146 (2013) (noting that social enterprises are “operating in a 
conceptual and regulatory no-man’s-land . . . where their activities may be regulated only by 
the good intentions of their founders and managers . . . .”).
 6.  Cf. Joseph Stromberg, A sports governance expert explains why FIFA is so corrupt 
— and how to fix it, VOX: CULTURE (last updated June 2, 2015, 1:08 PM), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/5/27/8671925/how-to-fix-fifa [https://perma.cc/55RV-S9P7] 
(describing how a lack of regulations on international sports associations, such as FIFA and 
the Olympics, has placed the associations in a “netherworld of governance”). 
 7.  See Brad Edmondson, The First Benefit Corporation IPO Is Coming, and that’s a 
Big Deal, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.triplepundit.com/2016/02/first-benefit-
corporation-ipo-coming-thats-big-deal/# [https://perma.cc/4KAY-YFUV] (“If the Laureate 
IPO is successful, it will provide a roadmap for institutional investors, family offices and 
individual investors who want to invest capital in businesses that generate a good return and 
make valuable contributions to society at large . . . . And it will provide a strong 
counterpoint to skeptics that believe that businesses cannot access institutional capital unless 
they focus exclusively on maximizing value for shareholders.”) (quoting Luke Stephan, Can
Private Equity Help Make Businesses Good?, LINKEDIN (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/can-private-equity-help-make-business-good-luke-
stephan?trk=hp-feed-article-title-like [https://perma.cc/LU6Q-S8CM]).
 8.  Impact investing refers to investors that are creating direct social impact through 
“targeted direct equity and debt investments in [social businesses] across developed and 
emerging markets.” WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR., ET. AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE 
BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 3–4 (Jan. 18, 2013) 
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER],
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GXM6-WM2Z]. 
 9.  JP MORGAN & GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, SPOTLIGHT ON THE MARKET:
THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY 6 (2014), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/socialfinance/document/140502-
Spotlight_on_the_market-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQJ2-KCR5].  
 10.  US SIF: THE FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, REPORT ON 
US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 2014 (2015), 
http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R3T-
PRYS].
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corporate partners, and in some cases even the global economy.  Thus, 
there are significant economic incentives to making sure the social 
enterprise sector is adequately supported.11  More importantly, there are 
also societal reasons we want social enterprises, individually and 
collectively, to be sustainable institutions.  Social enterprises can influence 
social change by improving the lives of those marginalized and excluded in 
various segments of our society.  Socially and environmentally conscious 
executives might believe that corporate governance mechanisms are not 
necessary for their businesses because those working in the social 
enterprise space are not predominately motivated by power and money.12
However, good corporate governance accomplishes more than mitigating 
fraud and scandals; it helps companies prevent corporate waste, effectively 
manage resources, and adapt to changing realities.  For every major media 
story of organizational corruption,13 there are many untold stories of small 
to mid-size businesses that fail in large part due to a lack of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Good corporate governance practices are 
necessary for a company’s sustainability, resilience, and scale.14  The long-
term social impact goals of social enterprises require that these companies 
endure and often necessitate growth to reach their target populations.  Thus, 
social enterprises need to develop and promote effective corporate 
governance across the sector if the promise of the social enterprise 
 11.  See Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing 
Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 354 (2007) 
(“Corporations are the pivotal store of risk capital in the United States, and the key holder of 
society’s wealth.  The manner in which corporations are governed will affect a wide range 
of national issues—from economic inequality to globalization.”). 
 12.  Corporate law scholars have linked the emergence of the social enterprise sector to 
the 2008 financial crisis. See, e.g., Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in 
Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States 
and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 642-44 (2013) 
(describing the resurgence of social enterprise as a result of the 2008 recession). 
 13.  See, e.g., Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for 
Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE — OFFICE OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS (May 27, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-
corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and [https://perma.cc/8NVL-65J6] 
(last updated June 9, 2015).  Allegations of FIFA corruption have been an on-going issue for 
FIFA. See generally LastWeekTonight, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: FIFA and the 
World Cup, YOUTUBE (June 8, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DlJEt2KU33I 
[https://perma.cc/AF5Y-RBEV] (describing FIFA as a “comically grotesque organization,” 
alleging corruption, and providing clips of other media outlets similarly criticizing FIFA). 
 14.  See Ozden Deniz, The Importance of Corporate Governance for a Well 
Functioning Financial System: Reforming Corporate Governance in Developing Countries,
14 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 219, 222 (2012) (arguing that “corporate governance is also a public 
policy concern” as it enhances local capital markets by attracting investors). 
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movement15 is to reach its full potential. 
Corporate lawyers16 not only help companies draft the charter 
documents that govern the business, they also help companies navigate a 
complicated network of organizational documents, state corporate law, 
private contracts, and federal and state regulations.17  Each of these factors 
contributes to and influences the governance structure of the company.  For 
this reason, corporate lawyers should have a significant role and lend their 
expertise to creating corporate governance models and enforcement 
mechanisms in the social enterprise sector.18  Legal scholarship to date on 
social enterprises has primarily focused on comparing,19 critiquing,20 and 
theorizing21 the new hybrid-entity22 legal forms enacted to accommodate 
 15.  The term “social enterprise movement” is regularly used to describe the increase in 
visibility and quantity, in roughly a decade, of businesses that use market strategies to make 
social impact. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying 
Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 222 (2012) [hereinafter Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law].
 16.  The terms corporate lawyer and transactional lawyer are used interchangeably in 
this Article to refer to the practice of law that integrates “the substantive business, financial, 
and lawyering skills needed to consummate business transactions.”  Susan R. Jones & 
Jacqueline Lainez, Enriching the Law School Curriculum: The Rise of Transactional Legal 
Clinics in U.S. Law Schools, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 85, 94 (2013).  While transactional 
lawyering has been used in other lawyering scholarship to describe a broad range of skills 
that includes almost any non-litigation-based practice, this Article narrows the use of the 
term to the representation of business entities where the legal team interprets, analyzes, and 
advises on private ordering, statutes, regulations, and case law to assist their clients in 
realizing their organizational goals and business objectives.  In the relevant scholarship, 
these lawyers are also referred to as deal lawyers. 
 17.  See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 
BUS. LAW. 279 (2009) (describing the various tasks and services provided by business 
lawyers). 
 18.  See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163, 176 (2008) [hereinafter Stop Teaching Dodge] (“When it comes to corporations, 
lawyers are ship captains.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise 
Frontier, 84 TULANE L. REV. 337, 342-47, 364-76 (2009) (comparing the various business 
entities chosen by social entrepreneurs). 
 20.  See, e.g., Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporations: An 
Economic Analysis and Recommendations, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1001 (2013) (noting that the 
article’s purpose is to “critically analyze[] the benefit corporation’s key elements and pose[] 
key questions that create uncertainty for courts to resolve”); Joseph Karl Grant, When 
Making Money and Making a Sustainable and Societal Difference Collide: Will Benefit 
Corporations Succeed or Fail?, 46 IND. L. REV. 581, 601-03 (2013) (expressing approval of 
the changes and growth of benefit corporations). 
 21.  See generally, e.g., Reiser, supra note 3 (theorizing forms of social enterprise). 
 22.  The term “hybrid entity” describes those entities formed under a statute that 
recognizes not only the for-profit nature of the enterprise but also the social mission of the 
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business commitment to both profit and social impact.  This Article 
expands guidance to social enterprise practitioners and corporate lawyers 
by arguing that the entire sector, not merely hybrid entities, needs to 
develop effective governance models and recommending benefit reports as 
a self-regulating mechanism the sector should adopt to support the 
development of social enterprise governance. 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides an overview of the 
corporate governance vacuum in the social enterprise sector and identifies 
why it is important for social enterprises to think critically about their 
corporate governance practices. Part II summarizes state statutory 
governance laws that fail to create adequate systems of accountability.  
Federal regulations promote accountability though disclosure requirements, 
but these seldom apply to most social enterprises, which are small, 
privately owned companies.  Thus, the Article argues that the social 
enterprise sector should adopt a new mechanism that encourages the 
development and maintenance of good corporate governance.  Given the 
impracticality of expanding government oversight to include small social 
enterprises, new governance theory23 provides a framework for 
understanding how state governments are facilitating social enterprise 
governance through hybrid-corporation legislation.  Finally, Part III 
outlines how the benefit reporting requirements in hybrid-corporation 
statutes can promote the development of social enterprise governance 
models.  This section concludes with specific recommendations for 
corporate lawyers to embed benefit reporting requirements into the DNA of 
the social enterprise regardless of the legal form.  If social enterprise 
practitioners and corporate lawyers collaboratively develop, document, and 
disseminate social enterprise governance models through benefit reports, 
then this collaboration will lead to a stronger, more resilient social 
enterprise sector that is better prepared to traverse the rough terrain towards 
sustained social change. 
entity, blending the social and profit obligations into one business.  This is distinct from a 
company structure that includes both for-profit and nonprofit entities within the same 
corporate family. See Ross Kelley, Note, The Emerging Need for Hybrid Entities: Why 
California Should Become the Delaware of “Social Enterprise Law”, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
619, 635 (2014) (“Recognizing the limitations and restraints posed on socially geared for-
profit organizations, several states have begun to develop a legislative model that blends 
attributes of traditional for-profit and nonprofit entities into ‘hybrid’ organizations.”). 
23 The term “new governance theory” describes a paradigm shift from top-down, command-
and-control regulation to collaborative governance systems.  New governance theory rests 
on the premise that the state alone cannot effectuate societal change and that it therefore 
needs to engage with private actors to leverage their expertise in dynamic and complex 
contexts.  See infra Part II.B.
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I. SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AND HYBRID ENTITIES
This section unpacks the term “social enterprise” and explores the rise 
of hybrid-entity legislation in the development of the social enterprise 
sector.  This part also explains the various contributions that hybrid-entity 
statutes have already made to expand and strengthen the social enterprise 
sector.  It concludes by remarking that social enterprise governance 
remains underdeveloped, notwithstanding these new business forms.   
A. The Emergence of Social Enterprises 
The term “social enterprise” does not have a precise definition and as 
such, while often used, it is also commonly misunderstood.  The term is 
evolving as it continues to be refined and contoured by business and legal 
practitioners and scholars.24  As the term suggests,25 it describes those 
business enterprises that intentionally impact societal good.26  Precise 
 24.  Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, What is a “Social” Business and Why Does the 
Answer Matter?, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 278, 279 (2014) (arguing that the 
definitions for “social enterprise” remains “hopelessly fractured” and “often conflicting”); 
see also J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit 
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347 (2014) (identifying that the term “social 
enterprise” is not well defined in the academic literature).   
 25.  Similar to terms such as social worker, social justice, and social change, the word 
“social” in the term “social enterprise” is a qualifier that focuses on vulnerable populations 
to the benefit of the greater society.  William P. Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested 
in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 7, 13-14 (2007) (“One good working 
definition of ‘social justice’ is the commitment to act with and on behalf of those who are 
suffering because of social neglect, social decisions or social structures and institutions.”); 
Reiser, supra note 3, at 693-94 (identifying “social good” as an intentionally vague and 
contested term allowing founders the flexibility “necessary to produce a vibrant and 
pluralistic civil society.”). 
 26.  MUHANNAD YUNUS WITH KARL WEBER, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW
KIND OF CAPITALISM THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS xvii (2010) 
(defining social business as dedicated entirely to achieving a social goal) (emphasis added).  
But see Brenda Massetti, The Duality of Social Enterprise: A Framework for Social Action,
REV. BUS., Winter 2012/2013, at 59 (defining social enterprises as “an organization where 
the majority of its social actions: (1) are congruent with the organization’s mission and have 
some degree of social legitimacy; (2) are community internalizing regardless of whether 
they are required or chosen; (3) make clear social contributions while producing financial 
contributions (i.e. profits) that exceed their resource consumption” (emphasis added) 
(endnote omitted)).  In a report to the Roberts Enterprise Development Fund (REDF), 
Mathematica Policy Research defines social enterprises as “mission-driven businesses 
focused on hiring and assisting people who face barriers to work.” DANA ROTZ ET AL.,
ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND LIFE STABILITY ONE YEAR AFTER STARTING A SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISE JOB xv (2015), http://redf.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/REDF-
MJS-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH2Y-9QA6].  
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definitions matter because there is misuse27 and confusion28 about how 
business ventures are determined to be social enterprises.29  The 
definitional variations are diverse enough to inspire a semester-long course 
I teach aimed at better understanding the meaning of the term social 
enterprise.30  As Marc Lane points out, because the term “social good” is so 
broad, virtually “every business corporation and every charity could fairly 
be characterized as a social enterprise.  After all, businesses employ people, 
fulfill the needs and wants of their customers, and pay taxes.  Similarly, 
charities provide altruistic and humanitarian services that would otherwise 
be performed by government or not at all.”31  Several accepted definitions 
of social enterprise narrow down the concept.  The Social Enterprise 
Alliance,32 a leading organization in the sector, defines social enterprises as 
“businesses whose primary purpose is the common good. They use the 
methods and disciplines of business and the power of the marketplace to 
advance their social, environmental and human justice agendas.”33  On the 
other hand, Professors Roger Martin and Sally Osberg’s definition of social 
entrepreneurship34 focuses on the target market that the enterprise seeks to 
 27.  See, e.g., Jim Schorr & Kevin Lynch, Preserving the Meaning of Social Enterprise,
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Sept. 14, 2012), 
http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/preserving_the_meaning_of_social_enterprise
[https://perma.cc/PT8V-W27S] (documenting how Salesforce.com “began using the term 
‘social enterprise’ to describe ‘how social and mobile cloud technologies are empowering 
companies to connect with customers, partners, and employees in entirely new ways’”). 
 28.  See M. Tina Dacin et al., Social Entrepreneurship: A Critique and Future 
Directions, 22 ORG. SCI. 1203, 1203 (2011) (“[A]s a nascent field, social entrepreneurship 
scholars are in the midst of debates involving definitional and conceptual clarity . . . .”). 
 29.  See Schorr & Lynch, supra note 27 (“For years, this new realm of hybrid ventures 
has struggled to define itself in a cohesive way, and the lack of a general consensus on 
terminology in this arena has been a constraint on the development of social capital markets, 
supportive policy environments, and other key pieces of the ecosystem needed to catalyze 
the growth of the field.”). 
 30.  Social Enterprise & Empowerment Clinic, THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, http://www.uchastings.edu/academics/clinical-
programs/clinics/socialenterpriseandeconomicempowerment/index.php 
[https://perma.cc/6ZD3-MCQQ] (last visited May 9, 2016).  
 31.  MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION DRIVEN
ENTREPRENEURS 6 (2011). 
 32.  Social Enterprise Alliance is a membership organization for social enterprises with 
local chapters across the United States. For more information, see the About Social 
Enterprise Alliance page, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://www.se-
alliance.org/about#ourrole [https://perma.cc/Z7U9-C358] (last visited May 9, 2016). 
 33.  LARRY D. WATSON & RICHARD A. HOEFER, DEVELOPING NONPROFIT AND HUMAN
SERVICE LEADERS: ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS 4 (2014) (reproducing the definition 
provided by Social Enterprise Alliance, which definition no longer appears on the Social 
Enterprise Alliance Website as of May 9, 2016). 
 34.  “Social entrepreneurship,” a term that is at times used interchangeably with the 
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serve and makes the meaning of social change more explicit: 
We define social entrepreneurship as having the following three 
components: (1) identifying a stable but inherently unjust 
equilibrium that causes the exclusion, marginalization, or 
suffering of a segment of humanity that lacks the financial means 
or political clout to achieve any transformative benefit on its 
own; (2) identifying an opportunity in this unjust equilibrium, 
developing a social value proposition, and bringing to bear 
inspiration, creativity, direct action, courage, and fortitude, 
thereby challenging the stable state’s hegemony; and (3) forging 
a new, stable equilibrium that releases trapped potential or 
alleviates the suffering of the targeted group, and through 
imitation and the creation of a stable ecosystem around the new 
equilibrium ensuring a better future for the targeted group and 
even society at large.35
More generically, Professor Filipe M. Santos defines social enterprises 
to be those businesses with a predominant strategic focus on value 
creation36 over value capture37,38 which explains why social enterprises are 
often in the business of providing services to socially neglected populations 
because that is where the potential for value creation is highest.  Professor 
Dana Reiser concisely summarizes her general idea of a social enterprise as 
“an organization formed to achieve social goals using business methods.”39
Another working definition of social enterprises are those for-profit 
businesses whose primary objective is to make social impact and nonprofits 
that incorporate market-based, commercial strategies to achieve their 
mission.40  Social enterprises often operate at the intersection of profit-
term “social enterprise,” is often the act of running or managing a social enterprise. But see, 
e.g., Raymond Dart, The Legitimacy of Social Enterprise, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT. &
LEADERSHIP 411 (2004) (using the terms “social enterprise” and “social entrepreneurship” 
interchangeably).  Social entrepreneurs are those founders of social enterprise.
 35.  Roger L. Martin & Sally Osberg, Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for 
Definition, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2007, at 35, 
http://ssir.org/images/articles/2007SP_feature_martinosberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XWP-
YGMR].  
 36.  Filipe M. Santos, A Positive Theory of Social Entrepreneurship, 111 J. BUS. ETHICS
335, 337 (2012) (defining value creation as the aggregate increase in utility of society’s 
members after accounting for the opportunity cost of all the resources used in that activity). 
 37.  Id. (defining value capture as the portion of value created by the activity after 
accounting for the cost of resources that the focal actor mobilized). 
 38.  Id. at 339; See also LANE, supra note 31, at 4 (defining social enterprises “as one 
not motivated by profit, in that any profit motive takes a back seat to a mission centered on 
curing an acute social malady”). 
 39.  Reiser, supra note 3, at 681. 
 40.  See LANE, supra note 31, at 7 (noting that social enterprises are “thinking about 
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generating enterprises and social change organizations.  Realizing that a 
social enterprise is either a for-profit or a nonprofit challenges assumptions 
about both sectors of business.  It is necessary to emphasize that the term 
describes more than the archetypical charity that often comes to mind.  The 
nonprofit social enterprise may have a business model that is most 
commonly used in for-profit businesses.  One example is an e-commerce 
company that uses an online platform to market and sell artisan crafts.  It is 
also equally important to understand that companies formed as traditional 
for-profit entities can effectively operate as social enterprises.  Newcomers 
to the social enterprise field tend to associate the term social enterprise with 
nonprofits exclusively.  The for-profit social enterprise should have a 
clearly articulated mission that could make it eligible for federal tax-
exemption, as its business income is substantially related to a tax-exempt 
purpose.  Thus, for many social enterprises, the company could have easily 
chosen to be formed as a for-profit entity or a nonprofit corporation. 
The common theme in each of the aforementioned definitions is that a 
substantial variety of business models and legal entity forms are contained 
within the social enterprise sector, from traditional for-profits to nonprofits 
to hybrid entities.  Although social enterprises have existed for more than a 
century,41 recent hybrid-entity legislation has catapulted the social 
social impact every day and, in that quest, are going about the serious business of applying 
strategic planning and management tools to social causes”). 
 41.  See About Us, GOODWILL INDUS. INT’L, INC., http://www.goodwill.org/about-us/ 
(quoting founder Rev. Edgar J. Helms as describing Goodwill, founded in 1902 and today a 
$4 billion nonprofit, as an “industrial program as well as a social service enterprise . . . a 
provider of employment, training and rehabilitation for people of limited employability, and 
a source of temporary assistance for individuals whose resources were depleted”); see also
Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of 
a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 211-17 (2010) (describing Ben & Jerry’s 
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enterprise movement to national attention and given new visibility to the 
growing sector.42  While the type of legal entity is an important part of 
understanding how a social enterprise can form, on a day-to-day basis 
corporate governance is also essential to determining the success of the 
social enterprise.43  As the following case studies exemplify, achieving a 
social mission requires thought and guidance regarding the corporate 
governance structure of the social enterprise. 
1. Case Study #1: Social Mission Achieved through Governance 
Imagine a social enterprise that has the primary goal of using 
professional, long-term employment to empower its individual employees 
to disrupt cycles of poverty, substance abuse, and recidivism.  This social 
enterprise is formed as a limited liability company (LLC) to allow the 
managers to raise capital from outside investors and the flexibility to 
operate the company in a manner that best supports the company mission. 
The core purpose of the company is not to simply employ but to restore 
dignity to its employees.  The managers of the LLC, thus, want the 
employees to be involved in various operational decisions that will affect 
their work and the direction of the business.  For example, employees are 
expected to provide insight on management structure, new software, 
expansion of product offerings, and employee scheduling.  Employees are 
encouraged to provide feedback and share ideas about what the company 
should be doing better. 
Thus, systematic employee participation in the operations of the 
company is a fundamental aspect of how the company seeks to achieve its 
social mission.  Engaging employees in a transparent, democratic process is 
a significant means to achieving the enterprise’s social mission of 
employee empowerment. Yet, at the entity formation stage, the company 
Homemade, Inc. as an iconic social enterprises in the early 1980s with a double-bottom line 
business model, which they called “double-dip,” was well known for its commitment to 
prioritizing progressive social goals over profits).
 42.  See HEERAD SABETI WITH THE FOURTH SECTOR NETWORK CONCEPT WORKING
GROUP, THE EMERGING FOURTH SECTOR: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2009), 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/4th%20sector%20paper
%20-%20exec%20summary%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HT9-DC9A] (“The Fourth 
Sector is emerging organically, the collective result of thousands upon thousands of 
initiatives at the individual organizational level.”).
 43.  See Renatto Garcia, Comment, Re-Engineering Georgia’s Corporate DNA: A 
Benefit Analysis and Practicality Assessment for Benefit Corporation Legislation in 
Georgia, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 627, 677 (2013) (identifying that the social enterprise “formula 
is far from perfect, giving rise to criticisms about conflicts of interest and the latent 
inefficiency of considering multiple stakeholder interests”). 
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was provided no legal counsel on how to establish a governance system 
through which employees would participate in operational decisions.  As a 
result, the company engages in ad hoc employee voting and collects 
irregular feedback from the employees.  The employees do not have 
consistent access to financial reports and company documents to inform 
their feedback.  A key component of the company’s social mission is to be 
accomplished through innovative, decision-making structures and 
processes; yet the company has no format through which to implement this 
social mission.  Without an established governance system uniquely 
designed to engage the employees in decision-making, there is no 
mechanism for determining if the company is achieving its social mission.  
Moreover, even when employees have ad hoc opportunities to provide 
meaningful contributions, they lack the information necessary to keep the 
managers accountable to the social mission of the company.44  Thus, this 
social enterprise that seeks to empower employees through democratic 
participation in decision-making has yet to disrupt the default “feedback 
loop that breeds . . . hubris at the senior executive levels”45 and 
marginalizes employee perspectives. 
2. Case Study #2: Balancing Stakeholder Participation through 
Governance
Imagine another social enterprise with the mission to reduce hunger in 
densely populated cities by connecting businesses with excess food to food 
banks, shelters, and other nonprofits who will distribute the food to 
individuals in need.  The company is formed as a traditional, for-profit 
corporation with outside shareholders and generates income by charging a 
subscription fee to businesses to pick up and drop off their excess food.  
The social enterprise provides logistical support to ensure that its business 
customers receive donation receipts so they can track their annual 
charitable giving.  Consistent with traditional corporate governance 
practices, the board is composed of executives and investor representatives.  
Thus, the company is in regular contact with and must be responsive to 
investors and its business customers.  However, the mission of the social 
enterprise is to reduce hunger, not merely to provide pick-up services for 
businesses with excess food.  The traditional board composition of 
 44.  See Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 351, 366 (2011) (“[F]ew outside parties are capable of meaningfully 
critiquing and checking executive decisions, given the economic and organizational 
advantages of corporate officers.”). 
 45.  Id. at 376. 
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management and investor representation “is procedurally designed to 
maximize shareholder wealth,”46 not innovate to end food insecurity.47
To maintain its ingenuity, the company will need to gather and 
incorporate feedback and ideas generated from the end-users of the service 
— i.e., individuals suffering from food insecurity and, perhaps, the 
nonprofit food distributors.48  How well this for-profit social enterprise 
gathers and incorporates information from its end-users will determine its 
success at developing new avenues to reduce hunger.  However, questions 
remain regarding obtaining the end-user feedback and how to incorporate it 
with investor interests, especially where the feedback and the investor 
interests conflict.  This social enterprise needs a mechanism for 
determining how it will collect various interests from its stakeholders and 
balance those interests where they do not align.  A well thought-out 
corporate governance policy and information structure would likely make a 
significant difference for this social enterprise because the balancing of 
these stakeholder interests is vital to the long-term sustainability of this 
company. 
B. Current Governance Vacuum 
Most social enterprises are not hybrid entities49 but are formed as 
traditional for-profit companies or nonprofit corporations.  Social 
enterprises are not required under the current governance regime to 
regularly evaluate and critically examine their corporate governance 
practices.  While some federal and state standards of corporate governance 
 46.  Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 20, at 1004. 
 47.  See Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and 
Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 247 (1999) (“[T]he optimistic idea that the rich can 
gain while helping the disadvantaged has meant in practice that the priorities of the 
empowered take over those of the disempowered even in the very programs which were 
meant to mitigate this general trend.”). 
 48.  JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF 
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 43-44 (1978) (“Organizations 
could not survive if they were not responsive to the demands from their environment.  But, 
we have noted that demands often conflict and that response to the demands of one group 
constrains the organization in its future actions, including responding to the demands of 
others.  This suggests that organizations cannot survive by responding completely to every 
environmental demand.  The interesting issue then becomes the extent to which 
organizations can and should respond to various environmental demands, or the conditions 
under which one social unit is able to obtain compliance with its demands.  By 
understanding the conditions of the social control of organizations, we believe it is possible 
to understand how organizations decide to comply with, or attempt to avoid, influence.”). 
 49.  See Plerhoples, supra note 4, at 90 (“[A] small cohort of hybrid entities have 
incorporated in numerous states.”). 
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are already established, there are few mechanisms for ensuring that social 
enterprises adhere to these standards.  Most for-profit social enterprises are 
closely-held companies that might not rise to the level that would require 
scrutiny from federal regulatory agencies or state attorneys general.  Thus, 
it is not surprising that there is a vacuum of corporate governance practices 
in the social enterprise sector even though, for many of these companies, 
their governance is a means to achieving their social mission. 
1. For-Profit Social Enterprises Not Subject to External Oversight 
Pursuing profit-making and a social mission does not always lead to 
the same business decisions.50
“Blended value, . . . [after all], could easily remain purely 
aspirational . . . [as] pursuing profit and social good will not 
always lead in the same direction . . . . Even if the stars align at 
the outset, eventually there will have to be decisions where profit 
and social good come into conflict and must be traded off.”51
Therefore, for-profit social enterprises must be diligent in how they reach 
business decisions and transparent about documenting their decision-
making processes.  However, there are few oversight mechanisms that hold 
a social enterprise accountable for documenting these decisions and good 
corporate governance. 
State laws establish the basic framework of distributing 
responsibilities within the company52 but are not sufficient to ensure that 
the flow of power is properly maintained in the best interest of the 
company.53  Outside monitoring from government agents is often required 
to hold companies accountable to good governance practices.  For example, 
the federal government monitors and enforces corporate governance 
practices through disclosure requirements that are in place to ensure that 
boards and managers follow the law.54  In the wake of global financial 
 50.  Reiser, supra note 3, at 684. 
 51.  Id.
 52.  See infra Part II.A. 
 53. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 71 (2008) (“[T]he institution of the board of directors, as we know it, is not a 
reliable corporate governance device. [Even if the] [b]oards of directors will not inevitably 
fail in the task of objectively monitoring management . . . [t]hey cannot . . . be expected to 
succeed reliably.”). 
54. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1914) (1914) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
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crises and high profile events such as the collapse of Enron,55 the federal 
government has been increasingly focused on minimizing risky financial 
transactions and improving the corporate governance of large corporations.  
Federal reforms such as the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act of 2002, commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (“SOX”),56 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)57 are aimed at improving the 
corporate governance of large corporations.  SOX imposes new 
responsibilities on corporate management, requirements for auditing firms, 
requirements for financial transactions, and procedures for conflicts of 
interests.58  The law focuses on requiring independent directors and 
established board processes.59  Under SOX, “directors can also face 
criminal liability for fraudulently influencing, coercing, or misleading an 
accounting firm during an audit, with the intention of rendering the audit 
report misleading.”60  Less than a decade later, in 2010, Congress enacted 
 55.  Leading up to the demise of Enron, “[c]ompany executives created high 
expectations among investors regarding the company’s growth potential and their unique 
skill-set to reach it, producing for a time an extraordinarily high stock market valuation. 
Meanwhile, the economic reality was turning out to be more sobering.  Increasingly 
aggressive, apparently fraudulent, steps were taken to report financial results and conditions 
that would not deflate investors’ expectations in a way that would put the managers’ jobs, 
compensation and perquisites – not to mention social status and self-esteem – immediately 
at risk.” Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: 
The SEC and Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1139 (2003). 
 56.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745-810 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 57.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 22, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 58.  See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 132–34 (2002)(noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 changes the oversight of auditing firms and strengthens auditing standards); 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and 
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 920 (2003)(identifying auditors, accountants, 
corporate officers, lawyers, securities analysts, credit rating agencies, and investment banks, 
among other groups, as designated for study or regulation by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002).
59. Another benefit of independent directors is that their outside perspectives can 
“serve as valuable advisers to the board and management about the company’s market, 
geographic, and product directions.” SPENCERSTUART, SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 2014
3 (2014),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/Spencer_Stuart_Board_Index_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S456-MLLA]. 
 60.  Stephen Glove & Robert Treuhold, Corporate governance and directors’ duties in 
the United States: overview, PRACTICAL LAW CO. (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://us.practicallaw.com/9-502-3346 (last visited May 9, 2016). 
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Dodd-Frank, which was “the most ambitious attempt since the New Deal 
legislation of the 1930s to regulate and reform not only the financial 
services industry, but also corporate governance.”61  For example, Section 
972 requires public companies to disclose in their annual proxy statements 
why they have or have not chosen to separate the roles of chairman and 
chief executive officer.62  These regulations, for good reason, do not apply 
to non-publically traded companies.  As a result, the primary federal 
legislation aimed at improving corporate governance is not applicable to 
most for-profit social enterprises, which are relatively small businesses. 
The federal government also enforces good corporate governance for 
companies that issue securities through disclosure requirements under the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).63  Securities regulation 
helps create a strong marketplace by promoting integrity in corporate 
governance and financial reporting. The SEC regulates the securities 
industry, establishes disclosure requirements for corporations, and regulates 
communications between the board and shareholders.  U.S. public 
corporations are required to disclose a wide range of information in annual 
and quarterly reports, as well as in the proxy statements.64 A company’s 
annual report filed with the SEC contains, among other items, an internal 
control report that must state the responsibility of management for 
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting and identify the framework used by 
management to evaluate the effectiveness of the corporation’s internal 
controls.65 Any director who makes or causes the making of any false or 
misleading statement in a document filed with the SEC can be held 
personally liable for the misstatement.66
It is unlikely that private companies, not otherwise required to, would 
implement these specific reporting procedures because the corporate 
governance requirements “are a jumble of [various] statues, rules, forms 
and schedules”67 that the average company would not be able to decipher 
 61.  Jonathan F. Foster, Another View: Improving Corporate Governance, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Jun. 11, 2010, 11:10 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/another-
view-how-to-improve-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/54LV-NBE6]. 
 62.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-210, §972, 124 Stat. 1915 (2010) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78n-2). 
 63.  See Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious” and reaffirming that SEC rule-
making requires strong empirical evidence to justify the costs and benefits of the rule). 
 64.  17 C.F.R. §240.14a-3 (2015). 
 65.  15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012). 
 66.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 67.  Gregory S. Porter, What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?: Public 
Company Disclosure and the Mythical Duties To Correct and Update, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
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without sophisticated legal representation.68  Moreover, the federal 
monitoring and enforcement system should not be expanded to all social 
enterprises given limited government resources and the potential financial 
burden federal reporting would place on the social enterprise sector. 
To the extent that most social enterprises are raising capital, it is likely 
through private placement transactions that are exempt from federal 
securities registration requirements.  Social enterprises are likely to have a 
limited number of shareholders with whom management has close 
relationships and who believe in the mission of the enterprise.  In theory, 
shareholders monitor the decisions of corporate boards,69 often by reference 
to corporate earnings.  However, active shareholder monitoring may be less 
likely for social enterprises because corporate earnings and profit metrics 
are not the only indicators of business success.  As a result, below market 
indicators may not give raise to shareholder scrutiny into the corporate 
practices. 
For these reasons, there are limited internal and regulatory controls 
encouraging small, for-profit social enterprises to adopt good corporate 
governance practices.  In the absence of legal requirements, companies are 
not likely to prioritize or see the value in thinking deeply about corporate 
governance issues.  However, for-profit social enterprises would greatly 
benefit from documenting their governance practices and working to 
innovate unique governance models.  Corporate reporting would help 
social enterprises better articulate how their competitive edge is achieving 
both their profit and social outcomes.  As traditional businesses are 
increasingly moving into recording their own social impact,70 social 
2199, 2199 (2000). 
 68.  Regulatory compliance is also expensive.  Public companies expend a significant 
amount of capital resources on complying with SOX, for example, and that cost of 
compliance continues to rise.  A majority, fifty-eight percent, of large public companies 
surveyed estimated they spent more than $1 million on SOX compliance in 2014 alone. 
PROTIVITI, INC., SOX COMPLIANCE – CHANGES ABOUND AMID DRIVE FOR STABILITY AND 
LONG-TERM VALUE 6 (May 2015), http://www.protiviti.com/en-
US/Documents/Surveys/2015-SOX-Compliance-Survey-Protiviti.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GV7W-YKGR].
 69.  David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1019–
23 (noting that shareholder primacy is a weak accountability mechanism for for-profit 
corporations). But see George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance Without Shareholders: 
A Cautionary Lesson From Non-Profit Organizations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 93, 114-16 
(2014) (arguing that shareholder primacy is the foundational accountability mechanism for 
good corporate governance).
 70.  See, e.g., 2015 Corporate Social Responsibility Report, CISCO,
http://csr.cisco.com/pages/csr-reports [https://perma.cc/25ZQ-HAJ3] (last visited May 9, 
2016) (providing links to corporate social responsibility reports); Sustainability Report 
2014/15, FORD (2015), http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustainability-report-2014-
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enterprises have faced increasing competition for investment dollars and 
customer attention.  For many social enterprises, their competitive 
advantage is the theory of social change within their business model.  But 
to maintain their momentum, social enterprises will need to remain at the 
forefront of crafting and disseminating their social impact narrative.71  As 
experts in the field have observed, there is “more bleed between social 
enterprises and traditional businesses,”72 meaning they are each 
increasingly taking on the characteristics of the other. This requires social 
enterprises to be more cost effective than their traditional peers in creating 
and articulating social change.73  If social enterprises can articulate and 
measure their social impact over time in a systematic way that could 
significantly improve their ability to attract funding.74  Therefore, the 
measurement of the social impact through a reporting process is 
fundamental to the long-term financial health of a for-profit social 
enterprise regardless of the type of legal entity. 
2. Nonprofit Social Enterprises Lack Internal Oversight 
A significant number of social enterprises are formed as nonprofits.  
“Contrary to popular belief, private philanthropy is not the main source of 
nonprofit revenue; rather, over forty percent of nonprofit revenue is derived 
from fees for services performed.”75  In part, because of the steadily 
15/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y8F5-678L] (last visited May 9, 2016) (reporting on its 
corporate sustainability in 2014/2015); Performance with Purpose: Sustainability Reporting,
PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico.com/Purpose/Performance-with-Purpose/Sustainability-
Reporting [https://perma.cc/DJC7-BLJX] (last visited May 9, 2016) (providing links to 
sustainability reports). 
 71.  See Claudia Cahalane, Social enterprises must continue momentum in social impact 
reporting, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/social-
enterprise-network/2012/oct/10/social-enterprise-momentum-impact-reporting 
[https://perma.cc/LAB6-2BCW] (“[S]ocial enterprises need[] to get involved with shaping 
existing and emerging tools for reporting”).
 72.  Id.
 73.  See John Anner, Jessica Alba and the Impact of Social Enterprise, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/jessica_alba_and_the_impact_of_social_enterprise
[https://perma.cc/ZQ4Z-VY7N] (“[W]ith 28 million small and medium enterprises in 
America, benefit corporations need to stand out from the crowd on the basis of their added 
social value.”). 
 74.  Reiser, supra note 3, at 684. (“Social entrepreneurs want to convey to investors that 
their entities will provide a different and better overall return — doing more for investors’ 
pocketbooks than a charitable donation and more for their souls than an ordinary stock or 
bond.”).
 75.  Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit 
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decreasing government support and limited philanthropic dollars in grants, 
nonprofits have increasingly looked to market-based strategies and revenue 
streams to cover their operation costs.76  As a result, a sizeable percentage 
of nonprofits are also social enterprises, because they use market-based 
strategies to pursue or sustain their charitable purpose.77  The blurred lines 
of a nonprofit with a business enterprise means that nonprofit directors 
often have many of the same corporate responsibilities as for-profit 
directors but generally with less financial resources and often no 
compensation for their time and effort. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the nonprofit sector often comes under 
scrutiny for failings of corporate governance.78 Scandals within the 
nonprofit sector illustrate that good intentions are not sufficient to replace 
good governance practices.79  The “ineffectiveness of nonprofit corporate 
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 929 (2003).
 76.  Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the 
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 457 (“[A] 
distinction [between nonprofits and for-profit corporations] long believed to be a difference 
of kind turns out to be a difference of degree.”); Karen A. Froelich Diversification of 
Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations, 28 
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 246, 246 (1999). 
 77.  “A recent Bridgespan Group survey of nonprofit executives found that half of these 
practitioners expected that earned income would play an important role in their 
organizations’ future.”  Jim Schorr, Social Enterprise 2.0: Moving Towards a Sustainable 
Model, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2006, at 12, http://community-
wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/article-schorr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BYF5-9KYJ].  
 78.  See Chongmyong Lee & Branda Nowell, A Framework for Assessing the 
Performance of Nonprofit Organizations, 36 AM. J. EVALUATION 299, 299 (2015) (“As a 
result of a growing emphasis on accountability in government funding, nonprofits are under 
increasing pressure to demonstrate excellence in performance in order to secure financial 
resources similar to their public and private counterparts.”); see, e.g., Michael McDonald & 
Brian Chappatta, Madoff Haunts Yeshiva as University Slides to Junk: Muni Credit,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2014, 9:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-
22/madoff-haunts-yeshiva-as-university-slides-to-junk-muni-credit [https://perma.cc/G4VA-
UUED] (quoting a Moody’s analyst explaining why Moody’s Investors Service cut the 
university’s rating to an unprecedented four levels below investment grade, “‘It’s about their 
management.’”); Philip Rucker, United Way Fundraising Rises after Scandal-Induced 
Plunge, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/11/29/AR2007112902007.html [https://perma.cc/G568-PCUP] 
(describing how corporate executive theft and mismanagement led to lost fundraising and a 
damaged reputation); Stephanie Strom & Campbell Robertson, As Its Coffers Swell, Red 
Cross is Criticized on Gulf Coast Response, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/us/nationalspecial/as-its-coffers-swell-red-cross-is-
criticized-on-gulf-coast-response.html [https://perma.cc/8E3N-Q9QU] (describing the 
public’s frustration with the Red Cross’s practice of not fully utilizing donations designated 
for particular relief, but instead allocating those funds to other programs). 
 79.  See Faith Rivers James, Nonprofit Pluralism and the Public Trust: Constructing a 
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governance and the virtual absence of accountability constraints” has not 
gone without considerable criticism.80  Calls for governance reform within 
the nonprofit sector have not made much impact in part because nonprofit 
corporate governance operates without much government oversight.81  The 
limited law on nonprofit corporate governance is fragmented primarily 
between corporate law and tax law.82  Because of the business structure and 
nonprofit corporate law statutes, directors of nonprofit social enterprises 
have fiduciary duties that mirror the obligations of for-profit directors.83
While nonprofit directors are held to high standards as stewards of assets 
dedicated to the public benefit,84 they are provided with little guidance for 
how to implement organizational oversight. 
Professor George Dent argues that nonprofit corporate governance is 
less effective than for-profit corporate governance in part because nonprofit 
directors do not know what directorship entails, and, as a result, the CEO, 
not directors, governs the nonprofit with little oversight.85  Nonprofit 
directors often have insufficient information to make informed decisions 
and provide executive oversight and evaluation.  The existence of 
shareholders in a for-profit business is a means to the ends of information 
Transparent, Accountable, and Culturally Competent Board Governance Paradigm, 9 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 94, 96 (2012)(noting that poor governance has contributed to the 
perception that the independent sector should improve the governance model). 
 80.  Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: 
Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 653 (1998). 
 81.  See James, supra note 79, at 95 (noting that nonprofits still operate in an 
independent manner, “outside of heavy government control”); see also Thomas H. Boyd, 
Note, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-For-Profit Corporation 
Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REV. 725, 741-42 (1987) (explaining that the New York statute 
specifically addresses the board’s “power to make and retain investments on behalf of the 
corporation”).
 82.  Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance — A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 347, 351 (2012) (“There is no single unified body of law that applies to charities 
and other nonprofits.  Instead, the law in this area is fragmented . . . . Instead, the law 
regulating nonprofit and charitable governance remains an amalgam of trust law, corporate 
law, and tax law.”). 
 83.  Id. at 356. 
 84.  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“A trustee is held to 
something stricter than the morals of the market place.”). 
 85. See, George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance Without Shareholders: A 
Cautionary Lesson From Non-Profit Organizations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 93, 99-100 (2014)
(discussing why nonprofit boards frequently do not govern); see also Evelyn Brody, The
Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps Between Law and Practice,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 521, 534 (2007) (“In the case of nonprofits, some observers believe 
that the absence of shareholders emphasizes an inappropriate reversal of the power 
relationship between the board and the officers.”). 
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generation because for-profit corporations have to produce regular annual 
reports and provide disclosures to shareholders.  Professor Dent argues that 
shareholder governance works particularly well because shareholders have 
a variety of enforcement tools at their disposal.86  Regardless of how 
unlikely shareholders are to use these enforcement tools,87 Professor Dent 
argues that the possibility of litigation serves as an effective accountability 
mechanism.88  While he is particularly negative about the quality of 
nonprofit governance, Professor Dent admits that similar poor governance 
characteristics are also found in for-profit companies.89  While helpful in 
identifying the shortcomings within nonprofit governance, it is clear that 
these issues are not unique to the nonprofit sector.90  Thus, Dent establishes 
the existence of a correlation between poor corporate governance and no 
shareholders without establishing that no shareholders causes poor 
governance.  Professor Dent’s analysis, for example, does not compare the 
governance practices between nonprofits and for-profit companies that 
have similar operating budgets.  One would likely find even more 
governance similarities between nonprofits and for-profits with similar 
operating budgets than Professor Dent acknowledges in this article.  If 
nonprofits had a mechanism for regularly producing information and 
disseminating it to directors, then this would address many of the 
 86.  See Dent, supra note 85, at 108 (describing how shareholders use the threat of a 
policy resolution for shareholder vote to “generate[] publicity that criticizes management.”). 
 87.  See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, 
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1644 (2001) 
(explaining that shareholder wealth maximization is a non-legally enforceable rule because 
of the judiciary’s hesitation to question business judgments); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.
L. REV., 547, 573 (2003) (“Shareholders exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day 
operations or long-term policy.”); Lin, supra note 44, at 367 (“[M]any institutional 
shareholders lack proper economic incentives and organizing mechanisms to meaningfully 
engage in shareholder activism.”).  
 88.  See Dent, supra note 85, at 108-09 (“The outside directors may not feel much of a 
personal stake in these battles; they may be unwilling to wage a public campaign against the 
shareholders just to preserve the privileges of the managers.”).
 89.  Id. at 106–108 (noting the possibility that “the board’s self-selected slate of 
nominees [can run] unopposed,” that “most directors who have failed to obtain a majority 
[shareholder] vote remain in their positions,” and that shareholder policy resolutions “often 
fail, and even when approved they are usually not binding on the board.”). See also
Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 525 (2005) (“For a while it 
was hoped that the condition of shareholder powerlessness would be remedied by the rise of 
institutional shareholders . . . . Unfortunately, this has not exactly worked . . . . The end 
result . . . is that the modern corporation is essentially a self-perpetuating oligarchy of 
managers largely immune from input by shareholders, employees, and directors.”). 
 90.  Dent, supra note 85, at 112-13 (comparing nonprofit boards to the functioning of 
large public companies). 
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governance weaknesses that Dent identifies.  In other words, it may be the 
collection of information and thoughtful review of company performance at 
various levels that creates a divide in company performance, not 
shareholder governance versus nonprofit governance as Dent posits. 
Many of the suggested measures for improving nonprofit boards also 
serve as critiques of for-profit boards.  The common recommendations for 
nonprofit boards include the carefully planned division of authority,91 clear 
definition of organizational goals, and standards for review of executive 
performance.92  Implementing these suggestions would depend on the 
volition of the directors, as there is no external force to compel their 
adoption.93  State attorneys general have the authority to oversee charitable 
organizations within their jurisdictions to prevent the mismanagement of 
the public’s donations.  However, they exert limited influence on nonprofit 
governance and often intervene late to resolve nonprofit issues.94  The 
California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 (the “Integrity Act”),95 for 
example, was an extension of the federal corporate governance 
resurgence;96 it requires that any charity registered with the California 
Office of the Attorney General, receiving annual gross revenues of $2 
million or more, must form an audit committee.97  The goal of the Integrity 
Act is to increase the scrutiny of high asset nonprofits, which account for a 
significant amount of wealth within this country.98  However, these 
 91.  JOHN TROPMAN & THOMAS J. HARVEY, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE WHY, WHAT,
AND HOW OF NONPROFIT BOARDSHIP 7–9 (2009).
 92.  DENNIS D. POINTER & JAMES E. ORLIKOFF, THE HIGH-PERFORMANCE BOARD:
PRINCIPLES OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION GOVERNANCE 23–79 (2002). 
 93.  See Nicole Gilkeson, For-Profit Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should States 
Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions Onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831, 852–53 
(2007) (noting that under-enforcement of nonprofit regulation in California will likely 
continue due to the limited resources of the California Attorney General). 
 94.  See Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967) 
(acknowledging the multiple duties of Attorney General’s office which necessarily make 
nonprofit oversight sporadic and neglected). 
 95.  California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, 2004 CAL. STAT. 919 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE and CAL. GOV’T CODE).
 96.  Gilkeson, supra note 93, at 847 (“The California Act is ineffective because it relies 
on a solution tailored for the for-profit sector—auditing requirements—instead of crafting a 
solution to address issues in the nonprofit sector.”). 
 97.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586(e)(2) (2005). 
 98.  The nonprofit sector contributed an estimated $984.9 billion of the U.S. economy 
in 2015, composing 5.4 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.  National Data: 
National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 1.3.5: Gross Value Added by Sector,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS tbl. 1.3.5, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=2
4 [https://perma.cc/5YDK-8QB6] (last visited June 6, 2016); see also Nonprofits Worth 
$887.3 Billion to U.S. Economy, NONPROFIT TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), 
942 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:4 
financial audit requirements only apply to large nonprofits and are unlikely 
to influence the governance of emerging nonprofit social enterprises. 
Perhaps the most significant agency for influencing nonprofit 
corporate governance is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which 
determines at the federal level whether a nonprofit qualifies for tax-exempt 
status.  Through the application of the Internal Revenue Code’s 
requirements for federal recognition of tax-exemption and the annual 
income tax reporting requirement, the IRS “attempts to reduce the potential 
for conflict of interest transactions by requiring disclosure of insider 
relationships, questioning relationships, and agreements that might result in 
excess benefit transactions, and explicitly suggesting that organizational 
bylaws include a comprehensive conflict of interest provision.”99  While 
helpful, outside of these limited circumstances, nonprofit social enterprises 
are not counseled on how to balance and manage competing interests 
within a sustainable business.  Arguments have been made for how 
voluntary clubs can complement and support enforcement of legal and 
regulatory obligations on nonprofit directors.100  Professor Brakman Reiser, 
for example, argues that while financial disclosure standards are the most 
developed for nonprofits, there is still a lack of enforcement of governance 
and mission accountability post nonprofit incorporation.101  “Performance 
measurement in the nonprofit sector is complicated by the fact that 
nonprofits often pursue missions whose achievement is difficult to 
measure.”102  In short, there are few tools for monitoring and supporting 
nonprofits governance.103  Thus, nonprofit social enterprises would greatly 
benefit from a mechanism by which to document and refine their corporate 
governance.
C. The Rise of Hybrid-Entity Legislation 
Laws to support the growth of the social enterprise sector have 
focused almost exclusively on developing new legal entity forms.  Starting 
http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/nonprofits-worth-887-3-billion-u-s-
economy/ [https://perma.cc/8CX8-75H9] (“The tax-exempt sector in the United States 
represented 5.4 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) during 2012, 
contributing $887.3 billion to the economy.”). 
 99.  James, supra note 79, at 100. 
 100.  Dana Brakman Reiser, Filling the Gaps in Nonprofit Accountability: Applying the 
Club Perspective in the U.S. Legal System, in NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY CLUBS:
VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NONPROFIT AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (2008).
 101.  Id.
 102.  Lee & Nowell, supra note 78, at 300. 
 103.  Hazen & Hazen, supra note 82, at 361.
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in 2007,104 jurisdictions enacted legislation on new legal forms to enable 
founders of social enterprises to explicitly claim social mission and profit-
making in a single entity.105  To date these new legal entities include the 
low-profit limited liability company (or “L3C”),106 the benefit LLC,107 the 
benefit corporation (or “b-corp”),108 and the social purpose corporation.109
These hybrid-entity statutes are the first new corporate forms with a 
national scope to be introduced into American corporate law since the 
limited liability partnership in 1991.110  Generally, these hybrid entities 
 104.  For example, L3C became an official entity in Vermont on April 30, 2008. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (2008).  See also OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (enabling an 
articles of incorporation “provision authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct the 
business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.”); 
Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for 
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1019 (2009). 
 105.  See Reiser, supra note 3, at 685 (“One of the most basic things social entrepreneurs 
seek in a specialized legal form is safe space to declare that their entities are committed to a 
new and different goal — pursuing both profit and social good.”). 
 106.  The L3C retain the flexibility and protections of the standard LLC while 
integrating the Internal Revenue Code definitions of “charitable” and “educational” purpose.  
Dana Thompson, L3Cs an Innovative Choice for Urban Entrepreneurs and Urban 
Revitalization, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 146 (2012).  If the L3C ceases to comply with the 
Internal Revenue Code definitions, it automatically converts into a traditional LLC.  Id. at 
150; see also Reiser, supra note 3, at 690 (“The L3C adds charitable or education purpose 
requirements to an otherwise standard LLC framework.”). 
 107.  The benefit LLC relies on the traditional LLC framework but requires the entity to 
pursue a general public benefit that is evaluated by a third-party standard.  MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4A-1101 to -1108 (LexisNexis 2013), amended by 2013 Md. 
Laws. ch. 527 (S.B. 697) (codifying benefit LLCs); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.750-66.770 
(2014).  Oregon is one of a few states that provides for the benefit LLCs; the greater number 
of benefit LLCs over benefit corporations in Oregon suggests that the LLC format often 
works better for small businesses.  See Active Benefit Companies, STATE OF OREGON,
https://data.oregon.gov/Business/Active-Benefit-Companies/baig-8b9x 
[https://perma.cc/KW9L-MSDG] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (listing the active benefit 
corporations in the State of Oregon). 
 108.  By statute the b-corp must pursue an articulated general public benefit, defined as 
“a material positive impact on society and the environment, . . . assessed against a third-
party standard . . . .”  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEG. § 102 (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016).  A b-corp is 
not synonymous with a company that has received certification from the organization B 
Lab, although both are called “benefit corporations.”  To be certified by B Lab as a benefit 
corporation an entity does not have to be incorporated or be a b-corp under state statute.  
 109.  See Alexandra Leavy, Necessity Is the Mother of Invention: A Renewed Call to 
Engage the SEC on Social Disclosure, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 463, 482-83 (2014) 
(describing the requirements of the Social Purpose Corporation). 
 110.  See Alysa Christmas Rollock, Professional Responsibility and Organization of the 
Family Business: The Lawyer As Intermediary, 73 IND. L.J. 567, 587 n.2 (1998) (noting that 
Texas was the first state to enact a statute allowing limited liability partnerships in 1991); 
Cf. Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the 
Corporate Governance Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 201 (2015) [hereinafter Corporate
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have been met with excitement111 and embraced by various segments 
within both the business and legal communities.112  But scholars have also 
documented the potential dangers and unintended consequences of 
segregating social enterprises into separate legal entities, namely 
succumbing to the theory that traditional for-profit entities require directors 
to prioritize profit maximization in their corporate decision-making.113
Objectives] (“[A] more recent corporate entity development is the rise of the ‘social 
enterprise.’”).
 111.  Kyle Westaway, Something Republicans and Democrats Can Agree On: Social 
Entrepreneurship, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Apr. 17, 2012), 
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/something_republicans_and_democrats_can_agree_on_social_e
ntrepreneurship [https://perma.cc/X4EE-AF4Y].   
 112.  Mike Isaac & David Gelles, Kickstarter Focuses Its Mission on Altruism Over 
Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/technology/kickstarters-altruistic-vision-profits-as-the-
means-not-the-mission.html [https://perma.cc/GM3J-JHYE]; Heerad Sabeti, The For-
Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/11/the-for-benefit-
enterprise [https://perma.cc/833C-DUL6].  Embracement by these communities will help 
these hybrid entities succeed. Cf. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS 64-69 (2004) 
(cautioning that interest-convergence, the apparent reconciliation of competing values, 
among the disenfranchised and empowered populations that lead to possibly effective 
remedies will not ultimately achieve promised structural change because these results will 
be abrogated at the point they threaten the empowered); Derrick Bell, Brown vs. Board of 
Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1980) 
(describing how the divergence of interests makes integration less feasible). 
 113.  Blount & Nunley, supra note 24, at 312 (“The danger of creating new entity forms 
is that in the long term, limiting social enterprise to certain entity forms may result in 
marginalizing the value creation concepts of social enterprise to a subset of business entities, 
which has the potential to limit social enterprise’s impact on society.  The creation of new 
hybrid entities also tacitly gives credence to the widely held but inaccurate view that 
standard, for-profit corporations can legally justify misconduct or unethical decision-making 
as the relentless pursuit of profits required by corporate law.”); Joseph W. Yockey, Does
Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 800 (2015) (“[S]ome maintain that 
benefit corporations statutes actually create a harmful dichotomy between ‘profit-only’ 
corporations and ‘responsible’ corporations.  The argument is that, by resting on the false 
premise that managers of traditional corporations must prioritize profits above all else, the 
benefit corporation form undermines efforts to convince all corporate managers that CSR-
driven activities are consistent with their fiduciary duties.” (emphasis in original)); see also
Joan Heminway, Random Thoughts on the Beneficiaries of Corporate Board Decision 
Making, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (June 10, 2015), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/06/random-thoughts-on-the-
beneficiaries-of-corporate-board-decision-making.html#more [https://perma.cc/J575-2J3U] 
(noting that for “states, like Tennessee, [that] have not expressly adopted in legislative or 
judicial rule-making a shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . the enactment of benefit 
corporation legislation may (unwittingly) be construed as an endorsement of the notion that 
directors of [traditional] for-profit corporations . . . are required to consider only or 
primarily . . . the pecuniary interests . . . of shareholders.”); Mark A. Underberg, Benefit
Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
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Although currently most social enterprises are not formed as a hybrid 
entity,114 the hybrid entities still serve an important and growing segment of 
the social enterprise sector.  Hybrid entities are visible representatives for 
the recent rise in social enterprises even if they are a relatively small 
percentage of social enterprises. Hybrid entities also help create the 
counter-norm for what it means to be a social enterprise in the public 
perception because they are off-the-shelf legal forms that contemplate 
profit returns and social mission.  Hybrid entities allow the emerging sector 
to better define which businesses fit the definition of a social enterprise.  
The legal structures of hybrid entities would not be advantageous for 
traditional charity-focused nonprofits that do not have a substantial revenue 
stream because hybrid entities do not provide a favorable tax treatment.115
Similarly, it is not clear that a traditional for-profit business would benefit 
from forming as a hybrid entity.  Thus, it is a fair assertion that, for all 
practical purposes, the vast majority of hybrid entities are social 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-
harmful-dichotomy/ [https://perma.cc/FXG9-M8FB] (“[V]iewed from a broader corporate 
governance perspective, the [benefit corporation] initiative — however well-intentioned — 
has troubling implications.  The problem is that its primary rationale rests on the mistaken, 
though widely-held, premise that existing law prevents boards of directors from considering 
the impact of corporate decisions on other stakeholders, the environment or society at large.  
This crabbed view of directorial fiduciary duties perpetuates the unfortunate misconception 
that existing law compels companies to single-mindedly maximize profits and share price, 
and in so doing undermines the very values that corporate governance advocates should 
seek to promote: responsible, sustainable corporate decision-making by companies of any 
stripe.”). But see MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEG. § 101(b) (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016) (“Application 
of business corporation law generally. — The existence of a provision of this [chapter] shall 
not of itself create an implication that a contrary or different rule of law is applicable to a 
business corporation that is not a benefit corporation. This [chapter] shall not affect a statute 
or rule of law that is applicable to a business corporation that is not a benefit corporation.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 114.  Exact numbers and percentages are hard to pin down because of the limited 
empirical data on the social enterprise sector. See Anner, supra note 73 (noting the 
“decided lack” of empirical data on social enterprises).  “There are 1008 companies that are 
certified B corporations.” People Using Business as a Force for Good, B LAB,
https://www.bcorporation.net/b-the-change [https://perma.cc/9TZF-6DV5] (last visited May 
9, 2016). There is also the Social Enterprise Database with approximately 1,800 social 
enterprises listed. Social Enterprise Database, GIVE TO GET JOBS: FOR-PROFIT JOBS THAT 
GIVE BACK, http://givetogetjobs.com/social-
enterprise.php?keywords=&zip=&zip_radius=&x=69&y=22] [https://perma.cc/RLM5-
PNLX] (last visited May 9, 2016).   
 115.  See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 387, 421 (2014) (“[T]he creation of these new hybrids does not create any new tax 
categories or treatments. The different types of hybrid corporations . . . are treated the same 
as more typical state law corporations.”). 
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enterprises, even though the community of social enterprises reaches 
beyond hybrid-entity forms.   
The argument for enacting hybrid-entity legislation is that traditional 
for-profit and nonprofit legal entities frustrate the potential of a social 
enterprise, forcing “a founder to choose between two equally inadequate 
categories.”116  Regardless of their legal necessity,117 one cannot deny the 
important normative discourse that hybrid-entity legislation has sparked 
about the role for-profit companies ought to play within society.118
1. Fiduciary Duties Restrict Social Mission Considerations 
The principal argument for hybrid-entity legislation is that fiduciary 
duties of traditional for-profit entities, particularly a for-profit 
corporation,119 force the directors and officers to prioritize owner 
maximization of profit, with no carve out to preserve the social mission of 
 116.  Reiser, supra note 3, at 683. See also WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 1 (“The 
sustainable business movement, impact investing and social enterprise sectors are 
developing rapidly but are constrained by an outdated legal framework that is not equipped 
to accommodate for-profit entities whose social benefit purpose is central to their 
existence.”).
 117.  See, Blount & Nunley supra note 110, at 223 (arguing that hybrid entities are “an 
overly complex solution to the relatively basic core difference between a social enterprise 
and a traditional for-profit business — a different corporate objective.  By focusing on this 
basic distinction, a much simpler, but more effective, approach to reform can be devised that 
addresses the heart of the problem.” (footnote omitted)). 
 118.  See TEDx, TEDxPhilly – Jay Coen Gilbert – On Better Businesses, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGnz-w9p5FU 
[https://perma.cc/E2CM-UNGN], at 10:10 (“Right now our capitalist system is not serving 
society; it’s serving shareholders. And we can’t run around expecting different outcomes 
until we change the rules of the game.”).  
 119.  See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The 
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end . . . and does not extend to . . . other 
purposes.”); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 1994) (“a 
corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to 
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”).  See also THOMAS J. BILLITTERI, MIXING
MISSION AND BUSINESS: DOES SOCIAL ENTERPRISE NEED A NEW LEGAL APPROACH? 14 
(2007),
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/New_Legal_Forms_Rep
ort_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XMZ-2SF8] (“[T]raditional corporations have a duty to 
maximize financial returns for shareholders, broadening that mandate to include a duty to a 
social mission could require revisions in state corporate law.”).  But see Stop Teaching 
Dodge, supra note 18, at 165-68 (explaining that the Michigan Supreme Court’s “offhand 
remark” regarding the powers of directors is “judicial dicta, quite unnecessary to reach the 
Court’s desired result” because the case deals “with controlling shareholders’ duties not to 
oppress minority shareholders” not directors’ fiduciary duties as it is often relied on). 
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the entity.120
Thus, it is often espoused that the fiduciary duty to maximize profits 
prevents or, at least, limits the ability of directors and officers to consider 
social goals at the risk of reducing profits.121  But as other scholars have 
noted, corporate law does not require that shareholder maximization be the 
sole objective of a for-profit entity.122  Courts routinely protect the 
decisions of directors under the judicial doctrine called the “business 
judgment rule”123 as long as any rational business purpose could have 
 120.  See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33, 
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html 
[https://perma.cc/TV3J-VNJX] (“In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate 
executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his 
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, 
which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society.”).
 121.  See Blount & Nunley, supra note 24, at 304-06 (recognizing and rejecting the 
shareholder primacy argument for which many commentators argue).  
 122.  See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate 
Governance Beyond the Shareholder Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 74 (2010) 
(“Indeed, neither case law nor corporate statutes impose on directors and officers an 
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.  Even in Delaware, whose corporate code is less 
receptive to stakeholder interests than many other state corporate statutes, there is no 
requirement that management decision-making maximize shareholder wealth or even be 
justified solely in terms of shareholder interests.”); John A. Pearce II, The Rights of 
Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. REV. 251, 251 (2015) 
(“Despite any misimpressions to the contrary, corporate statutes do not dictate that directors 
have a singular duty to pursue profit-maximizing activities.”); Stop Teaching Dodge, supra
note 18, at 172 (“[T]he notion that corporate law as a positive matter ‘requires’ companies 
to maximize shareholder wealth turns out to be spurious.”); Yockey, supra note 113, at 770 
(“Proponents miss the mark when they argue that benefit corporation laws are necessary to 
enable firms to put social goals on par with profits.  Indeed, corporate law already provides 
entrepreneurs with much of what the benefit corporation form claims to offer.”); see
generally, Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of 
Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder 
Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409 (2002) (discussing directors’ fiduciary duties in 
various contexts as the law exists and is changing). 
 123.  See Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 (11th Cir. 1989) (describing the 
judicial deference given the board as the business judgment rule); Smith v. Van Gorkam, 
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (explaining that the “business judgment rule exists to protect 
and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware 
directors” and thus rest on the “fundamental principle . . . that the business and affairs of a 
Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors”); PRINCIPLES OF CORP.
GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (outlining the duty of care required by directors 
and officers to a corporation, subject to the business judgment rule); Douglas M. Branson, 
The Rule That Isn’t A Rule - the Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 632 
(2002) (summarizing the development, role, and applicability of the business judgment rule 
for modern directors). 
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possible future benefit to the shareholders.124  As Professor Lynn Stout 
argues, there is “judicial eagerness to protect directors” such that even 
when they fail to offer long-run shareholder benefits, the court will often 
make the connection for the directors.125  There are few legal scholars who 
would not agree that, apart from limited defensive126 and change of control 
decisions,127 “the business judgment rule will shelter corporate directors 
from liability for virtually all operational decisions.”128
Although corporate law does not require directors and executives to 
prioritize shareholder maximization in all decisions,129 the widely-held, 
public perception is that profit objectives dominate traditional for-profit 
companies.130  Those profit maximizing objectives, the perception 
 124.  Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp, 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (“[T]he business 
judgment rule shields directors from personal liability if, upon review, the court concludes 
the directors’ decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose.”); see also Lin, 
supra note 44 at 369 (“Courts historically have shown great procedural and substantive 
deference to the decisions and judgments of corporate executives.”). 
 125.  Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18 at 171. 
 126.  Directors are provided significantly less deference when the courts review 
decisions undertaken defending takeover attempts. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors have the benefit of the 
business judgment rule only if the directors can first demonstrate a legitimate threat to a 
corporate policy and that their response was reasonable given the threat posed); eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Directors of a for-
profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a [corporate mission] to defend a business 
strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization – at least not consistently 
with the directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.”). 
 127.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986) (finding that when the company is broken up and shareholders are forced to sell their 
shares, the board has a duty to maximize shareholder wealth by getting the highest possible 
price for the shares). But see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (2002) (providing examples of the 
Delaware Supreme Court systematically cutting back the situation where Revlon applies).
 128.  Reiser, supra note 3, at 687. 
 129.  See Page & Katz, supra note 41, at 231-32 (discussing how profit maximization 
may be the norm, but that norm is likely unenforceable in courts that regularly grant boards 
of directors deference under the business judgment rule). 
 130.  See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 26, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/06/26/the-
shareholder-value-myth/ [https://perma.cc/E5MV-UADS] (“Shareholder-value thinking 
dominates the business world today. Professors, policymakers, and business leaders 
routinely chant the mantras that public companies ‘belong’ to their shareholders; that the 
proper goal of corporate governance is to maximize shareholder wealth; and that 
shareholder wealth is best measured by share price (meaning share price today, not share 
price next year or next decade)”). See also Corporate Objectives, supra note 110, at 233–34 
(“Because of the contractual uniformity around the default corporate objective of 
shareholder wealth maximization, the public perception of the rigidity of the for-profit 
corporate does not match the reality of flexibility allowed by law.  This perception had led 
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contends, will inevitably compromise any social goals in the company’s 
decision-making.  For this reason, legal theorists Edward Rock and 
Michael Wachter characterize profit maximization as a “non-legally 
enforceable rule or standard” or norm.131  They acknowledge that 
competitive theory is a strong motivator to maintain the standard of 
executives maximizing corporate profits.132  But they argue that the 
standard is not legally enforceable.133  Courts are extremely reluctant to 
intervene in claims “that managers are not maximizing firm value” and, 
thus, reliably reject these shareholder claims.134  Although not legally 
enforceable, the norm of profit maximization is still a dominant force in 
for-profit company decision-making — so much so that legally enforceable 
rules are unnecessary to perpetuate this practice across industry. 
Hybrid entities, thus, are a powerful step towards disrupting the profit 
maximization norm within for-profit companies.135  The hybrid-entity 
forms allow founders, directors, and officers to preempt the common 
conception that profit objectives will eventually govern business decision-
making by explicitly designating the dual social mission commitment of 
the company.136  The hybrid-entity form also establishes a clear expectation 
for owners137 about the direction of the company that should mitigate owner 
to an inaccurate but honestly felt need from social entrepreneurs for new business entities.”); 
Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18, at 164 (noting that the general public pays little 
attention to the scholarly debate regarding the legal purpose of the corporation). 
 131.  Rock & Wachter, supra note 87, at 1643 (“The most striking example of a 
transfirm [non-legally enforceable rule or standard] of the corporation seems to be 
‘maximize profits.’”). 
 132.  Id. at 1644. 
 133.  Id.
 134.  Id.
 135.  See, e.g., Press Release, Ello, PBC, A Better Way (Oct. 20, 2014), 
https://ello.co/wtf/downloads/ello-pbc.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B2P-WFHJ] (“Ello exists for 
your benefit, not just to make money.”); Jonathan Shieber, Ello Raises $5.5 Million, Legally 
Files as Public Benefit Corp. Meaning No Ads Ever, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/23/ello-raises-5-5-million-legally-files-as-public-benefit-
corp-meaning-no-ads-ever/ [https://perma.cc/Q68J-4YUN] (discussing Ello’s ability to raise 
significant venture capital funds despite rejecting traditional revenue streams based on ads 
and selling user data).
 136.  Reiser, supra note 3, at 684 (“Rather than hiding these dual aspirations [of profit-
making and social mission] behind a veneer of ‘business as usual’ or under the halo of 
selflessness, these founders want to claim their social enterprise’s blended missions 
explicitly.”).
 137.  See Celia R. Taylor, Berle and Social Businesses: A Consideration, 34 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2011) (explaining that charter documents are contracts “that provide 
the discipline and incentives that corporations expect from fiduciaries”); see also PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 n.6 (AM. LAW.
INST. 1994) (“[T]here is little doubt that [social mission decisions] would normally be 
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concerns down the line.  Traditional for-profit legal entities may provide 
the executives and directors with the legal right to consider non-
shareholder stakeholders and social mission, but the hybrid entities 
typically mandate a requirement for executives and directors to consider 
the mission.138  Thus, the argument goes, hybrid entities remove speculation 
and position the social mission in a prominent place within the company 
decision-making. 
2. Nonprofit Structure Restricts Revenue Generation 
On the other hand, the argument is that the nonprofit legal form139 is 
also insufficient for social enterprises because it does not provide the same 
potential for growth and retaining talent as for-profit legal entities.  While 
all directors and officers must maintain the social mission of the 
nonprofit,140 the inability141 to raise capital through equity investment142
frustrates the company’s ability to scale and attract competitive talent.  
Retaining talent over the life of the nonprofit is also a serious barrier 
because a nonprofit business cannot provide equity incentives to its 
employees unlike lean, for-profit start-ups.  The limit on commercial 
activity directly related to the tax-exempt purpose of most nonprofits 
imposes yet another obstacle to growth.  The tax-exempt status of the 
permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders.  Such an agreement might be embodied in 
the certificate of incorporation, or not.”). 
 138.  See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016) 
(“[D]irectors . . . shall consider the effects of any action or inaction upon . . . the ability of 
the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit purpose and any specific 
public benefit purpose.”). 
 139.  Although nonprofits can be formed as corporations, charitable trusts, or LLCs, this 
Article recognizes that most nonprofit entities are formed as corporations and, thus, will use 
nonprofit and nonprofit corporation interchangeably.  
 140.  See Harvey J. Goldschmid, supra note 80, at 641 (noting that nonprofit directors 
should be “principally concerned with the effective performance of their nonprofit’s 
mission”). 
 141.  See Clara Miller, The Equity Capital Gap, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 41, 42 
(Summer 2008), 
http://www.socialimpactexchange.org/sites/www.socialimpactexchange.org/files/publicatio
ns/equity_capital_gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/E897-WBCG] (highlighting the difference 
between for-profit corporations’ ability to solicit equity capital, and nonprofits restrictions in 
doing so because individuals are prohibited from owning and distributing profits in a 
nonprofit corporation). 
 142.  See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 
(1980) (“A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from 
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as 
members, officers, directors, or trustees.”). 
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nonprofit social enterprise means that executives cannot use all possible 
business strategies to support the business that would otherwise be 
available if the entity was for-profit.143  The effect of limited commercial 
activity means that many nonprofits depend on charitable donations from 
the public and grants from the philanthropic sector.  This is particularly 
problematic for social change organizations or companies that pursue 
counter-cultural objectives, as many social enterprises seek to do.144
Generally, the philanthropic sector financially supports those organizations 
that are not engaged in radically altering established power structures.145
This means that social change organizations have a particularly hard time 
finding funding and financial stability.  “The hope is that the hybrid nature 
of a social enterprise will allow firms to bypass the structural and financing 
obstacles that confront . . . nonprofits so they can address social issues in 
innovative ways.”146
3. The Current Impact of Hybrid Entities 
While approximately three-quarters of state jurisdictions now provide 
for some hybrid-entity form,147 a limited number of social enterprises have 
 143.  See Reiser, supra note 3, at 682, 685-89 (describing the assertion that “social 
enterprises can do more good for more people than traditional nonprofits because their 
financing and business methods make them more efficient, effective, and scalable.”). 
 144.  See William A. Bottiglieri et al., The Regulation of Non-Profit Organizations, 9 J. 
BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH, no. 9, 2011, at 51 (noting that nonprofit organizations often 
receive funding based on projects, which “can become problematic if the organization is not 
currently working on a specific project which has caught the attention of the public”). 
 145.  See Rickke Mananzala and Dean Spade, The Nonprofit Industrial Complex and 
Trans Resistance, 5 SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOC. POL’Y 53, 57-58 (2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1201022 [https://perma.cc/G27F-T4ZY] 
(“The process of successfully applying for funding, including having 501(c)(3) status or a 
fiscal sponsor, researching applicable grants, writing formal funding requests using specific 
jargon, having an awareness of current trends in funding, and having personal relationships 
with philanthropic professionals requires skills and relationships that are concentrated in 
people with educational, class, and race privilege.”). But see Alex Daniels, Ford Shifts 
Grant Making to Focus on Inequality, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (June 11, 2015) 
https://philanthropy.com/article/Ford-Shifts-Grant-Making-to/230839 
[https://perma.cc/64LF-NWAN] (explaining why the Ford Foundation, a leader in 
philanthropy, has changed its grant making focus to support broad social-change movements 
and providing more operating expenses, president Darren Walker said a consistent theme 
was that people “especially nonprofit leaders, feel that foundations aren’t investing in 
building their institutions, building their capacity, and making them more durable and 
fortified”).
 146.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 773. 
 147.  See Brewer, Minnigh & Wexler, Social Enterprise by Non-Profits and Hybrid 
Organizations, Portfolio #489, Social Enterprise Hybrids Across the U.S., BLOOMBERG BNA
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adopted these new legal entities.148  Different hybrid entities have different 
potential reasons why founders and managers may not be selecting them.  
For the L3C, the reasons posited include the lack of clarity regarding its 
taxation status and ability to attract program-related investments from 
private foundations.149  For the benefit corporation statutes, one reason is 
the lack of precedent for how courts will enforce the fiduciary duties under 
this corporate form.150  By creating new legally enforceable fiduciary duties 
to additional stakeholders, hybrid entities require managers and directors to 
serve “two masters,” also described as “dual mission-management.”151
Thus, hybrid entities potentially generate more ambiguities and uncertainty 
than solutions.  There is also the issue that corporate lawyers, who social 
entrepreneurs consult with for entity formation counsel, are not generally 
comfortable advising their clients to experiment with these new entity 
forms.152
(2014), http://socentlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Social-Enterprise-Hybrids-Map-
Mar-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M9Q-3NAG] (providing a map showing various hybrid-
entity forms as they do or do not exist in the United States). 
 148.  See Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 115, at 389 (estimating that over “1000 of these 
new entities now exist”). 
 149.  See Thompson, supra note 106, at 145-50 (discussing the reluctance of foundations 
to make program-related investments (PRIs) to L3Cs because it may be unclear whether it 
constitutes a proper PRI or improper “jeopardizing investment” for tax purposes, and the 
“low-profit” designation of L3Cs deters other types of investment).  Program-related 
investments are tax-exempt investments, often low-interest loans or investments with an 
anticipated low return on investments, which private foundations make in nonprofit and 
social enterprise programs that further the tax-exempt mission of the private foundation.  
For additional information regarding program-related investments, see Program Related 
Investments, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Private-
Foundations/Program-Related-Investments [https://perma.cc/QT6F-KNYX] (last visited 
May 11, 2016).
 150.  See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1027-34 (2013) (highlighting the numerous conflicts that 
arise when benefit corporation directors must make a decision, requiring directors to weigh 
many factors and consider multiple constituents, which leads to inferior decision-making 
practices); Murray, supra note 2, at 27 (criticizing the lack of guidance for directors in 
carrying out their fiduciary duties).  
 151.  See Applying Traditional Corporate Law, supra note 15, at 223 (describing the 
“two masters” issue for social enterprises as enterprises having a profit motive, but with 
social or environmental missions still at their core); Laura A. Constanzo et al., Dual-Mission
Management in Social Entrepreneurship: Qualitative Evidence from Social Firms in the 
United Kingdom, 52 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 655, 659–60 (2014) (discussing the divisive 
nature of some business corporation structures due to competing interests). 
 152.  See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 
43 (2015) [hereinafter An Early Report on Benefit Reports] (noting the relative novelty of 
the benefit corporate form to some attorneys, and the misinformation among companies and 
legal sources when discussing benefit corporations); Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18, at 
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Another barrier to social enterprises incorporating as hybrid 
corporations is the perceived hardship in the benefit reporting 
requirement.153  Hybrid-corporation statutes have, for the first time, 
included regular reporting requirements that are regulatory in nature, 
requiring social enterprises to measure impact and provide transparency 
about the company’s social mission.154  Traditional corporate statutes do 
not require similar public transparency.  Corporate lawyers and companies 
may be hesitant about the potential expense and effort of regularly 
producing these benefit reports.  But as explored above, selecting a 
traditional for-profit or nonprofit entity can lead to deficiencies in corporate 
governance and, thus, jeopardizes the sustainability of the social enterprise.  
In fact, the legal entity selected for the social enterprise may not matter as 
long as the company has the appropriate corporate governance structure in 
place.  That said, the benefit reporting required of hybrid corporations may 
be an incredibly helpful tool in facilitating the social enterprise sector to 
develop and share corporate governance platforms that balance profit and 
mission. 
Corporate lawyers working with social enterprises need an effective 
vocabulary to articulate the value of the benefit reporting requirements 
contained in the hybrid-corporation statutes.  This Article continues the 
conversation on the contributions of hybrid-corporation statutes by 
explaining the impact that benefit reporting requirements could have on 
increased social enterprise governance, if adopted by social enterprises 
regardless of their legal form.  Improved corporate governance across all 
social enterprise legal forms is necessary for a more effective and 
sustainable social enterprise sector. 
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARADIGMS
The established corporate governance paradigm provides standards for 
transparency and accountability, but the regulatory governance regime is 
largely based on regulating and monitoring public companies.  However, 
all companies, even small social enterprises, need robust corporate 
governance enforcement mechanisms because business entities, regardless 
of size, contain a variety of divergent interests that need to be aligned.  
Corporate law plays a major role not only in helping companies align these 
174 (noting that it takes “a certain degree of boldness to depart from [corporate law] 
tradition.”).
 153.  See infra Part II.C for more details on the requirement of various benefit reports. 
 154.  See Yockey, supra note 113, at 799 (discussing the unique public/private 
characteristics of benefit corporation enabling laws).   
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divergent interests by requiring a system of checks and balances among the 
board of directors, executives, and owners, but also by establishing legal 
liability for the breach of fiduciary duties amongst these parties.  In 
addition to the statutory framework of corporate governance, companies 
and industries have developed norms that function as a de facto corporate 
governance regime to promote best practices and a state of mind around 
balancing interests.  Currently, the limited corporate governance 
enforcement and norm development in the social enterprise sector means 
there are not adequate governance mechanisms for these unique entities.  
Social enterprises are, thus, particularly vulnerable to risk and mishaps that 
could otherwise be avoided with sustained corporate governance practices. 
A. Statutory Framework of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance refers to the rules and structures for effective 
business oversight that bring a balance of power between the divergent 
interests of the managers, directors, and owners in furtherance of the 
company’s goals.  Effective corporate governance is achieved by the 
adherence to standards of behavior and performance demands.155  There is a 
well-developed, for-profit legal framework defining the rights and 
responsibilities of three social systems: directors, managers, and 
shareholders.  When implemented effectively, corporate governance 
provides several systems to ensure that the company is run efficiently and 
achieving its primary purpose, whether that be maximizing shareholder 
value for a for-profit company or advancing the specified tax-exempt 
purpose of a nonprofit corporation.  Effective corporate governance results 
in well-managed companies that have the capacity to outperform their 
competitors and exist for a long time.156
This section explores the various factors that make up the components 
of the United States corporate governance regime.  Both federal and state 
laws play a foundational role in helping companies align the divergent 
interests among the executives, the board of directors, and the owners.  
Regulatory agencies also influence and impose corporate governance 
standards.  Lastly, market demands and the globalization of business also 
have an increasingly profound influence on corporate governance best 
 155.  See Chris Mason et. al., From Stakeholders to Institutions: The Changing Face of 
Social Enterprise Governance Theory, 45 MGMT. DECISION 284, 293 (2007) (discussing the 
creation of explicit or implicit standards that reflect the needs of the primary beneficiary of 
the corporation). 
 156.  Varun Bhat, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present, and Suggestions for 
the Future, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1435–36 (2007). 
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practices. 
The primary purpose of corporate governance in a for-profit entity is 
to align the defining characteristic of corporate design, separation of 
ownership157 and control.158  The legal innovation of the for-profit 
corporation allowed for the growth of the modern economy by stratifying 
constituencies that have pluralist interests within the entity.159  The interests 
of shareholders and managers, who act on behalf of the shareholders to 
operate the business, do not always coincide.160  Management may engage 
in reckless or fraudulent business practices to maximize short-term benefits 
that increase the value of their annual bonuses, create stock price 
distortions, or improve their working conditions at the expense of the 
shareholders’ ownership value.161  In theory, the board curtails the actions 
of the managers to the benefit of the shareholders by providing supervision, 
reviewing business decisions, and establishing corporate policies.  But the 
directors who serve on the board are often key executive managers and 
independent directors who are selected by the very managers they are 
supposed to oversee.  Thus, the objective of good corporate governance to 
harmonize those pluralist interests for the common goal of the legal entity 
is not likely achieved by mere structure alone. 
There are three commonly recognized categories of corporate law: 
 157.  Investors contribute capital in exchange for ownership of the corporation and avoid 
liability past the amount of their investment for the acts of the corporation. 
 158.  See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATIONS AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84-90 (Transaction Publishers ed. 1991) (classifying the varying degrees 
of separation between ownership and control among the two hundred largest American 
corporations). 
 159.  DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 4 (2010) (“Historians have pointed to one event that occurred during the 
Renaissance as among the most significant in modern history: the creation of the limited-
liability joint-stock corporation.  This legal innovation made it possible and attractive for 
investors to pool capital to build companies that could grow virtually without limit.”). 
 160.  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753-54 (2002) (highlighting 
the fact that directors may inadvertently deviate from optimal executive compensation plans 
due to several external factors, which leads to rent in the form of excessive executive 
compensation that is contrary to shareholder interests). 
 161.  See JAY SAMIT, DISRUPT YOU!: MASTER PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION, SEIZE
OPPORTUNITY, AND THRIVE IN THE ERA OF ENDLESS INNOVATION 96 (2015) (“CEOs will 
gladly overpay for [a] company if the acquisition enables them to keep their jobs.  This is 
why so many acquisitions end up adding no value to the acquirer.  The CEO is not risking 
his or her career with the purchase of a company; on the contrary, the CEO is buying 
another chance to keep his or her job.”); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 198 (2012) (“[D]otcom era frauds typically 
involved cooking the books so as to raise — or at least support — the firm’s stock price so 
that the managers could profit from their stock options.”). 
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“(1) ‘internal’ corporate law (that is, the requirements set out in an 
individual corporation’s charters and bylaws); (2) state corporate codes; 
and (3) corporate case law.”162  The state statutory and case law where the 
company is incorporated establishes the basic framework for the 
responsibilities and the role of the board as well as imposes the division of 
responsibilities and fiduciary duties on officers, directors, and 
shareholders163 to better distribute power within a corporation.  Arguably at 
the center of the pluralist interests of the company is the board of 
directors,164 which collectively is the governing body upon which the state 
statutory codes impose the most requirements.165  The role of the board is to 
formulate corporate policies and oversee the managers and officers who 
implement those policies through the day-to-day operations of the 
company.166  The role of the board is to appoint, oversee, and compensate 
senior management; review budgets and strategies; and scrutinize the 
financial reporting and capital structure of the company.  Thus, one of the 
board’s priorities is the ongoing assessment of its effectiveness in 
performing this oversight function.167
This statutory emphasis on the board is what Professor Bainbridge 
refers to as a “board-centered system of corporate governance,”168 which is 
in contrast to previous orientations in corporate law that were shareholder-
 162.  Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18, at 168. 
 163.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2015) (requiring the corporation to hold 
annual shareholders meetings to elect the directors); Id. § 211(d) (2009) (allowing 
shareholders to call special meetings if the corporation’s organizational documents allow 
them to do so). 
 164.  STEVEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 32-35 (2008) (hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE)
(arguing that the contractarian theory of the corporation posits that the board of directors is 
the corporate nexus); PHILIP STILES & BERNARD TAYLOR, BOARDS AT WORK: HOW
DIRECTORS VIEW THEIR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2001) (highlighting that “the board 
[of directors] is the link between the shareholders of the firm and the managers entrusted 
with undertaking the day-to-day operations of the organization”). 
 165.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 141(a) (2015) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of the 
board of directors”). 
 166.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002). 
 167.  STEVEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 164, at 11-
12, 15 (arguing that “there must be mechanisms to ensure director accountability” and that 
“the board has virtually unconstrained freedom to exercise business judgment.”). 
 168.  Id. at 4 (stating that “[u]nder all corporation statutes, the key players in the formal 
decision-making structure are the members of the board of directors who are empowered to 
make or delegate to employees most decisions affecting the business and affairs of the 
corporation.”).
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centric169 or managerial-centric.170  Historically, statutory corporate law has 
a “strong emphasis on collective decision-making by the board,”171 in large 
part to counter-balance the pathologies of corporate managers who, if left 
un-checked, could engage in self-serving decision-making.  For example, 
in California the corporate code requires at least two directors if the 
corporation has more than one shareholder.172  State corporate law, as 
modified by the corporation’s charter documents, provides that the board 
can exercise all of the corporation’s powers.173  However, certain decisions 
and transactions require shareholder approval, such as mergers and 
amendments to the charter documents.174
Directors owe the corporation and its shareholders fiduciary duties.  
Principally, there are two duties: the duty of care, which requires a director 
to make informed prudent decisions, and the duty of loyalty, which requires 
the director to place the interest of the corporation above her own personal 
interest in a transaction or decision.  In determining whether a board of 
directors has satisfied its fiduciary duties of care, the courts apply the 
business judgment rule, which assumes the fiduciary duties of care have 
been satisfied unless there is an interested director and a duty of loyalty 
issue.175  Directors’ decisions may be more strictly scrutinized with respect 
to certain transactions, including a change of control of the corporation.  
But corporation codes and case law only provide the basic framework of 
corporate governance.176  Despite these state-imposed duties and structure, 
 169.  Shareholder primacy assumes that the shareholders should control the corporation, 
in some ultimate fashion, as they are the appropriate beneficiaries of director fiduciary 
duties and corporate governance.  STEVEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 164, at 10. 
 170.  See Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1611, 1612 (1981) (noting that the corporation “was run by managers who were accountable 
only to themselves and could blink at obligations to shareholders and society.”). 
 171.  Bainbridge, supra note 166, at 19. 
 172.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 212(a) (2015). 
 173.  Id. § 208 (2015). 
 174.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2015) (requiring shareholder approval of 
a board’s proposed amendment to charter); Id. § 271(a) (2016) (requiring a majority 
shareholder approval to sell or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets). 
 175.  There is the likelihood that any number of board decisions could have the potential 
to increase the long-term benefit to the corporation.  Thus, courts allow a great scope in 
determining if the decision could be in the long-term interests of the company.  STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 242 (2002) (“[T]he duty of care tells 
directors to exercise reasonable care in making corporate decisions . . . [but] the business 
judgment rule says that courts must defer to the board of directors’ judgment absent highly 
unusual exceptions.”). 
 176.  BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 164, at 20 (“The 
statutory model of corporate governance is splendidly minimalist.  Corporation codes 
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there is still concern that boards are not meaningfully accountable within 
the company.177
Most states allow a corporation to eliminate or limit directors’ 
personal liability to the corporation or its shareholders for breach of their 
fiduciary duty of care.178  Corporations often adopt provisions in their 
certificates of incorporation eliminating directors’ liability to the fullest 
extent permitted by law, which in Delaware means that directors are not 
liable unless they breach their duty of loyalty or act in bad faith.179  Despite 
these statutory guidelines and case law, there is so much flexibility in 
exercising the duty of care that the best interests of the company are not 
adequately enforced by state corporate law alone.180  The contractual 
relationships within the firm that the statute creates, while helpful for 
establishing the basic structure of the corporation, are inadequate to govern 
all the relationships of the company.181  Thus, a company also needs good 
internal policies and structures to regulate its corporate governance. 
B. New Governance and Transfirm Norm Creation 
Statutory corporate laws are necessary to establish the basic 
framework of distributing responsibilities within the company but are 
insufficient to ensure sharing of information and balancing of competing 
interests in good corporate governance.  The substance of good corporate 
governance is not mandated by the state but enacted and adopted by the 
company in charter documents, policies, and procedures.  Governance 
scholars theorize that corporate law creates a framework that will facilitate 
provide only very limited guidance as to proper roles for boards of directors.”). 
 177.  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 278, 290 (1999) (arguing that directors “are not subject to direct control 
or supervision by anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.”). 
 178.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015) (allowing for “eliminating or 
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for 
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,” except as otherwise specified 
in that section of the statute). 
 179.  Id.
 180.  See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, G20/OECD
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-
Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD96-NGZT] (emphasizing the 
importance of public enforcement and regulatory authorities in promoting and maintaining 
good corporate governance). 
 181.  Rock & Wachter, supra note 87, at 1640. See also Litowitz, supra note 89, at 508 
(“As a force of legitimation, corporate law lays down a thick rhetorical gloss to convey the 
impression that corporate governance is a realm of procedure, fairness, consensus, and 
business judgment.”). 
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the development of standards that will privately regulate the company.182
As Professors Rock and Wachter summarize, “the myriad transactions that 
take place inside the [company] are largely (but not entirely) protected by 
the fundamentally different governance mechanism, one that is almost 
entirely not legally enforceable.”183  Decisions within the company, they 
argue, are largely “governed by norms rather than law.”184  Norms differ 
from law in that they are not legally enforceable.  The task each company 
must achieve is to establish those norms that enhance their accountability to 
stakeholders and allow them to resolve problems within the company. 
Another characteristic of norms is that they form what is often referred 
to as company culture, because norms influence behaviors and social 
interactions.185  Of course not all norms are conducive to the company’s 
success.186  Desirable norms serve “a coordinating function, making it more 
likely that employees will do what they are supposed to do when they are 
supposed to do it.”187  Some norms “are top-down, with senior management 
choosing and enforcing them.  Others emerge bottom-up and might then be 
adopted and enforced by the firm.  Still others can become a kind of 
counterculture, enforced not by the firm but by the employees 
themselves.”188  The role of the board is to determine which desirable 
norms support the success of the business.  To be adopted within the 
company as a norm, the norm needs to be consistent with the company’s 
mission and broader values. 
Furthermore, norms are not merely limited to a company but can reach 
across an industry.  These norms across firms are what Professors Rock and 
Wachter refer to as “transfirm” norms.189  These desirable transfirm norms 
are often what we refer to as best practices in an industry.  For example, the 
notion that directors have board term limits is an instance of a transfirm 
norm.  Board terms are instituted to mitigate groupthink and deference to 
executive decisions.  New perspectives on the board can prevent inertia and 
can inspire new directions for the company.  In other words, transfirm 
 182.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 770, 802-06. 
 183.  Rock & Wachter, supra note 87, at 1640 (this is in contrast to “the transactions 
between the firm and its suppliers, customers, and other parties who work outside of the 
boundaries of the firm are largely (but by no means entirely) governed by legally 
enforceable contracts.”). 
 184.  Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator of Self 
Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 529, 534 (2000). 
 185.  Rock & Wachter, supra note 87, at 1642. 
 186.  Id. at 1643. 
 187.  Id. at 1642. 
 188.  Id. at 1642.
 189.  Id. at 1643-45. 
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norms are an important element of how companies and industries are 
resilient through change and help promote and reinforce desirable corporate 
behavior.  Thus, the legal system has strong incentives for supporting the 
development of these transfirm norms in various industries.  How the legal 
system effectively influences non-legally enforceable norms is the 
challenge scholars have devoted much time to researching.190
New governance theory191 not only provides a theoretical framework 
to address how government can facilitate desirable transfirm norms but also 
explains the potential impact of hybrid-corporation statutes on the 
development of social enterprise governance.  The umbrella term “new 
governance” describes the unifying principles among several strains of 
legal scholarship.192  One of the core principles of new governance theory is 
a commitment to stakeholder problem-solving and the development of 
norms facilitated through state intervention that is ultimately shaped and 
informed by practitioner implementation and innovation.193  “[N]ew 
governance . . . refers to a collection of ideas for governance where law 
serves as a launching point for a multi-dimensional approach to addressing 
complex social and economic challenges.”194  New governance maintains 
that the state is an important component as a facilitator rather than a 
regulator, while the implementation of policy is left to those individuals 
with the subject matter expertise.  For state-imposed laws to function under 
the new governance model, the laws need to be flexible and adaptable to 
allow for experimentation at the implementation stage.  This flexibility, 
which can also be characterized as ambiguity, requires the collaboration of 
both legal and industry forces to achieve the desired outcomes. 
New governance methods are particularly useful with complex 
industries, markets, or problems because they enable “the development of 
holistic, creative, cross-disciplinary, cross-jurisdictional, and cross-
 190.  Id. at 530-32. 
191 The term “new governance theory” describes a paradigm shift from top-down, 
command-and-control regulation to collaborative governance systems.  New governance 
theory rests on the premise that the state alone cannot effectuate societal change and that it 
therefore needs to engage with private actors to leverage their expertise in dynamic and 
complex contexts.  The traditional, hierarchical regulation approach, “which is generally 
adversarial and punitive,” places the state in opposition to private actors, while new 
governance models engender partnership, revision, and collaboration.  David Hess, Social
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate 
Accountability through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 453 (2007). 
 192.  Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance 
Work for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 405 (2013). 
 193.  Id. at 406. 
 194.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 799.
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institutional solutions.”195  Case studies have qualitatively demonstrated 
improved outcomes when new governance methods are used to address 
complex issues.196  Corporations are isomorphic in that they internalize 
institutional norms and function within the same statutory regimes;197 and, 
thus, can be conducive to developing transfirm norms through new 
governance methods.   
Applying this literature to social enterprises, a new governance 
perspective to analyzing hybrid-corporation statutes recognizes that the 
new “legal forms and structures can send important signals that help to 
form a consensus around particular norms.”198  Because desirable transfirm 
norms can coalesce into industry best practices, hybrid-corporation statutes 
can also be interpreted as an attempt to create best practices within the 
nascent social enterprise sector. This warrants further examining the 
normative impact hybrid-corporation statutes may have on solving 
governance issues within the social enterprise sector.199
C. Benefit Reporting as a New Governance Model 
The benefit reporting requirements within hybrid-corporation statutes 
have quasi-regulatory characteristics that make them unique among the 
corpus of corporate law.200  These regular reporting requirements also 
provide the authoritative foundation upon which social enterprises can 
develop, document, share, and refine corporate governance models and 
practices within this sector.  In enacting hybrid-corporation statutes, the 
state’s primary role has been to facilitate and promote collaboration among 
social enterprise practitioners to, among other things, develop governance 
norms.  Not only could the benefit reporting requirements lead to new 
governance practices for hybrid corporations, but these statutory 
frameworks could also establish the de facto market forces that influence 
and maintain good corporate governance in the social enterprise sector. 
 195.  Lee, supra note 192, at 412. 
 196.  Id. at 416. 
 197.  Mason et al., supra note 155, at 293 (demonstrating that organizational action 
converges “where regulatory and other external environmental conditions are supportive of 
it.”).
 198.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 801. 
 199.  See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 520-22 (2001) (discussing the law’s normative impact 
on context-based problem solving to eliminate employment discrimination within individual 
companies).
 200.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 799.
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1. Benefit Reporting Overview 
State legislatures, at the behest of B-Lab pioneers,201 have innovated 
corporate statutory laws by creating hybrid corporations such as the benefit 
corporation and the social purpose corporation.  Additionally, they have 
also, for the first time, included regular reporting requirements that are 
regulatory in nature and resemble the federal securities reporting 
requirements.202  The reporting requirements apply to the hybrid entity, 
regardless of the company’s size or number of shareholders.  These 
“benefit reports” requirements vary from state to state in aspects such as 
how often they need to be produced and distributed to the stakeholders, the 
necessary components of the reports, and the standards used to measure the 
company’s social impact.  Despite these differences, the benefit reports 
share more in common than not as the primary objectives of all benefit 
reports is to measure impact and provide transparency about the company’s 
social mission.  The following outlines the key characteristics in the benefit 
report statutory requirements. 
a. Model B-corp: accountability focused reporting 
requirements
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (the “Model”) is the most 
widely adopted hybrid-corporation statute.203  The benefit corporation 
under the Model (the “Model B-corp”) is required to send an annual benefit 
report to shareholders “[w]ithin 120 days following the end of the fiscal 
year of the benefit corporation or at the same time the benefit corporation 
delivers other annual reports to shareholders.”204  The Model B-corp benefit 
report must be posted to a publically available portion of the company’s 
website or provided free of charge upon request.205  This annual benefit 
 201.  WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 5. 
 202.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 799.
 203.  Murray, supra note 24, at 346-48; State by State Status of Legislation, B LAB,
http://benefitcorp.org/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/Z4ZH-GVY8] 
(explaining that to date, the Model has been adopted in at least 31 states including Arizona 
(2014), Arkansas (2013), California (2012), Colorado (2014), Connecticut (2014), District 
of Columbia (2012), Florida (2014), Hawaii (2011), Idaho (2015), Illinois (2013), Indiana 
(2015), Louisiana (2012), Massachusetts (2012), Maryland (2010), Minnesota (2015), 
Montana (2015), Nebraska (2014), Nevada (2014), New Hampshire (2015), New Jersey 
(2015), New York (2012), Oregon (2014), Pennsylvania (2013), Rhode Island (2014), South 
Carolina (2012), Tennessee (2016), Utah (2014), Vermont (2011), Virginia (2011), and 
West Virginia (2014)) (last visited May 11, 2016). 
 204.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402(a)(1)-(2) (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016). 
 205.  Id. at § 402(b)-(c). 
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report must also be filed with the Secretary of State, with a fee to offset the 
additional administrative cost to collect and sort through the reports.206
The reporting categories are vague for the Model B-corp and, thus, 
vary at the state level.207  Oregon, for example, requires the company’s 
disclosure of: the actions and methods used to provide a general or specific 
public benefit; any circumstances that hindered or prevented a benefit; and 
how well the benefit company met or exceeded the third-party standard.208
The Model requires that the Model B-corp assess its overall social and 
environmental performance on a yearly basis using an independent third-
party standard.209  There must also be a compliance statement from the 
benefit director.210  However, the assessment does not need to be audited or 
certified by a third party.211  The reasoning for the third-party standard, 
which is described as the lynchpin to the Model B-corp,212 is that it will 
prevent the benefit corporation from using an assessment tool that is merely 
self-serving.  However, third-party standards vary significantly,213 resulting 
in a lack of consistency among the current benefit reports.  For instance, 
there is also significant latitude in what the benefit corporation reports or 
not under the various third-party standards. 
The Model does not, however, expressly include an enforcement 
mechanism specifically related to either the truthfulness or even the 
existence of those reports.214  As a result, a number of benefit corporations 
have not provided or even produced the required benefit reports, and there 
 206.  Id. at § 402(d). For example, Rhode Island requires a $60 filing fee and 
Massachusetts requires a $75 filing fee with the annual benefit report. R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN.
§ 7-5.3-13 (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §16 (West 2016). 
 207.  Murray, supra note 24, at 359.
 208.  OR. REV. STAT. § 60.768(2) (West 2016).  
 209.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a)(2) (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016). 
 210.  Id. § 401(a)(5) (referencing MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302(c) which describes 
annual compliance statement requirements). 
 211.  Id. § 401(c). 
 212.  Reiser, supra note 3, at 690-91 (“These third-party standards lies at the heart of the 
benefit corporation concept.”). 
 213.  How Do I Pick a Third Party Standard?, BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/how-do-i-pick-third-party-standard
[https://perma.cc/4LZX-SFUH] (last visited May 19, 2016) (providing a non-exhaustive list 
of third-party standards for benefit reporting); see also An Early Report on Benefit Reports,
supra note 152, at 49 (noting that “the quality of the [third-party] standard used is not 
currently regulated.”). 
 214.  Theoretically, shareholders can bring a claim under the benefit enforcement 
proceeding process.  But without monetary liability for failure to pursue or create a general 
public benefit, it is not likely that shareholders would go through the expense or trouble of 
brining such a case against the benefit corporation.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305 (B
LAB Jan. 13, 2016); Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 20, at 1075. 
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has been little to no action taken to correct these statutory violations.  The 
Model has been criticized for this lack of an enforcement mechanism.215
b. Delaware PBC: board-centered reporting requirements 
The majority of public corporations in the United States and over sixty 
percent of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware.216  For this reason, 
among others, Delaware is a recognized leader in corporate law.  Not 
surprisingly, Delaware established its own version of a benefit corporation 
statute called the public benefit corporation (the “PBC”), which in several 
ways resembles the Model B-corp.  One of the material differences 
between the PBC and the Model B-corp are the deviations in the benefit 
reporting requirements.217  The PBC must include: 
(1) The objectives the board of directors has established to 
promote such public benefit or public benefits and interests; (2) 
The standards the board of directors has adopted to measure the 
corporation’s progress in promoting such public benefit or public 
benefits and interests; (3) Objective factual information based on 
those standards regarding the corporation’s success in meeting 
the objectives for promoting such public benefits or public 
benefits and interests; and (4) An assessment of the corporation’s 
success in meeting the objectives and promoting such public 
benefit or public benefits and interests.218
The PBC promotes a board-centered approach and provides for 
flexibility at each critical component of the benefit report.  PBCs, for 
example, do not have to assess their impact using an independent third-
party standard, unless specified in the corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation.219  Thus, under the Delaware statute, the board is empowered 
to use its own assessment tool, to determine if the report needs to be made 
public,220 and determine if assessment needs to be conducted more than 
once every other year.221  The benefit report needs to be produced no less 
 215.  An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 152, at 44. 
 216.  About Agency, STATE OF DELAWARE — DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS,
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/R6S7-UWW3] (last 
visited May 11, 2016). 
 217.  Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s 
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 254 (2014). 
 218.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2015). 
 219.  Id. § 366(b)(2) (2015). 
 220.  Id. § 366(c)(2) (2015). 
 221.  Id. § 366(c)(1) (2015). 
2016] SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNMENT 965 
than biennially in Delaware.222
c. California SPC: governance focused reporting requirement 
California is the most populous state to pass hybrid-entity legislation 
and is a strong economic engine globally.223  The disruptive trends in 
California influence what happens in other regions of business.  It is also 
considered the leading jurisdiction in the developing social enterprise 
economy and is the domicile of one of the highest number of hybrid entities 
formed to date.224  The state enacted a benefit corporation statute based on 
the Model B-corp.225  However, in addition to the benefit corporation, 
California is among the few states to also offer the social purpose 
corporation (“SPC”),226 formerly named the flexible purpose corporation 
(“FPC”).227
The SPC is a for-profit alternative to the traditional corporation and 
the California benefit corporation.  While the SPC integrates the majority 
of the characteristics of the former FPC, in addition to the name change, the 
amendments require the directors of SPCs to consider the social purposes 
set forth in the articles of incorporation in their decision-making.228  All 
SPCs regardless of size and number of shareholders must now prepare 
social-purpose annual reports including management discussion and 
analysis (“MD&A”) concerning the company’s operations and performance 
 222.  Id. § 366(b)(2) (2015). 
 223.  Samantha Masunaga, We’re No. 8: California near top of world’s largest 
economies, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 2, 2015, 1:21 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
california-world-economy-20150702-story.html [https://perma.cc/CH8Y-NXV6] (last 
visited May 19, 2016). 
 224.  Empirical data collected to date shows that Nevada has the most companies 
incorporated as benefit corporations, followed by Oregon, Delaware, Colorado, New York 
and California. See ELLEN BERREY, How Many Benefit Corporations Are There? 1 (May 5, 
2015), SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602781 [https://perma.cc/36TT-G99X] 
(Click “Download This Paper”) (last visited May 11, 2016). 
 225.  See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600-14604 (2012). 
 226.  See Id. §§ 2600–2604 (2015); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.005 
(2012).
 227.  However, a flexible purpose corporation incorporated under the Corporate 
Flexibility Act of 2011 is not required to change its status to a social purpose corporation 
and any reference in the California Corporations Code to social purpose corporation is 
deemed a reference to “flexible purpose corporation” as well. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§
2601(b)(2), (b)(3)(A) (2015).  
 228.  Id. at § 3500(b) (2015).  FPCs were not required to pursue a general society benefit 
like the benefit corporation and FPC directors were not required to include social purposes 
in their decision-making, but had the flexibility to do so. 
966 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:4 
with respect to its special purposes.  Similar to the Model B-corp’s annual 
benefit report, the social-purpose annual report anticipates a discussion of 
management strategy and skills.  The social-purpose reports are also 
required after certain events, such as significant capital expenditures that 
may have a negative effective on the company’s social purpose.229  Thus, 
the SPC social-purpose annual report is analogous to the aforementioned 
benefit reporting requirements.  However, there are no specifics about what 
should be included in the social-purpose annual report, which enables SPCs 
to neglect disclosing or discussing where they did not advance their social 
purpose.  The SPC statute does not require an independent third-party 
standard to measure progress, which limits the accountability the social-
purpose annual report may provide. 
2. Benefit Reporting as Value Creation 
Each of these hybrid-corporation statutes can be understood from a 
new governance perspective as the state encouraging social enterprise 
practitioners to develop governance norms.  “A new governance [take] on 
self-regulation [would suggest] that the state should allow private actors in 
specific industries or sectors to shape the standards and practices that 
govern their affairs.”230  The benefit report requires discussion of overall 
company performance, which necessarily requires an examination of 
corporate governance practices, without dictating specific mandates about 
what the governance practices should be.231  The Model states that the 
annual benefit report is intended to permit an evaluation of . . . 
performance so that the shareholders can judge how the directors 
have discharged their responsibility to manage the corporation 
and thus whether the directors should be retained in office or the 
shareholders should take other action to change the way the 
corporation is managed.232
Similar to the MD&A section of SEC registration statements and 
 229.  Id. at § 3501 (2015).  For FPCs with less than 100 shareholders that followed 
certain procedures, the companies were also not required to measure and disseminate their 
performance against a third-party standard in a benefit report, as benefit corporations are 
required to do. See Id. § 3502(h) (2012). 
 230.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 802-03. 
 231.  See generally Jessica E. Sowa et. al, No Longer Unmeasurable? A 
Multidimensional Integrated Model of Nonprofit Organizational Effectiveness, 33 
NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 711 (2004) (discussing a method to evaluate 
nonprofit effectiveness). 
 232.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 cmt. on Third Party Standard (B LAB Jan. 13, 
2016).
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periodic reports filed under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, a social enterprise’s MD&A section of the benefit 
report should discuss its business as a whole and include explanations of 
the various segments of the business necessary to understanding the 
company’s entire operations.  A MD&A section of a benefit report would 
be the appropriate place for the company to explain the governance model 
of the social enterprise and how it facilitates the stated social mission, 
including mechanisms for gathering and incorporating stakeholder 
feedback in the strategy of the company.  Because reporting on the 
“objectives the board of directors has established to promote [the] public 
benefit”233 will necessitate a consideration of the governance model, the 
periodic and regular compositions of these benefit reports would allow the 
social enterprise an opportunity to examine its corporate governance 
structure and make strategic decisions about moving forward.  In addition, 
this annual or biennial review of the company better fulfills the board’s 
obligations to provide management oversight, a commonly criticized 
missing component in social mission organizations. 
A criticism of the benefit reporting requirements is that they are 
ambiguous.  But the apparent lack of statutory direction for benefit 
reporting is appropriate to provide social enterprise practitioners the 
autonomy to determine the necessary elements of the report.234  One of the 
core principles of new governance theory is a commitment to practitioners 
developing the implementation through problem-solving and 
experimentation.  In furtherance of this, “new governance . . . intentionally 
lacks formal procedural or substantive rights, and contains only non-
binding initiatives,”235 to provide practitioner flexibility and buy-in.  To the 
extent that clear best practices emerge from the social enterprise sector for 
drafting the benefit reports, these are factors that could be included in the 
various state statutes through amendments with the support of the social 
enterprise community.  However, “[a] detailed, rules-based approach to 
reporting might also suffocate firms, stifle innovation, and decrease 
intrinsic motivation,”236 which also explains why the current lack of detail 
in the benefit report requirement is appropriate. 
There is no indication that social enterprise practitioners or corporate 
 233.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b)(1) (2015). 
234.    Hess, supra note 190, at 455 (“New Governance operates not by setting strict 
standards on regulated entities, but by setting the boundaries that allow experimentation to 
occur at a more local level and then allowing the lessons from those experiences to update 
standards and possibly be transferred to other areas.”).
 235.  Lisa T. Alexander, Reflections on Success and Failure in New Governance and the 
Role of the Lawyer, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 737, 742 (2010). 
 236.  An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 152, at 48-49. 
968 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:4 
lawyers perceive the benefit reports as a governance tool.  For social 
enterprises incorporated as hybrid corporations, the early data on benefit 
reporting reveals an “abysmal benefit report compliance rate (below ten 
percent).”237  An important role that corporate lawyers should play is in 
articulating how an examination of governance is an essential aspect of 
company performance.  Corporate lawyers are an indispensable component 
of the federal corporate governance paradigm and compose significant 
components of the disclosure reports for public companies.  The 
professional responsibility rules of the legal profession add legitimacy to 
the federal reporting process.238  Social enterprise practitioners’ do not 
perceive benefit reports as necessary in part because there is no government 
enforcement of this statutory requirement.239  But there is an opportunity 
for social enterprises to substantially use this tool; and, thus, corporate 
lawyers should explain the long-term value of regular reporting and not 
merely the short-term expense to produce. 
a. Benefit report perceived as marketing tool 
Generally the benefit report is characterized as a marketing and 
branding tool for social enterprises240 not a corporate governance 
mechanism.  Proponents of the Model B-corp have emphasized the benefit 
report as useful for customers, likening the report to a branding tool for the 
 237.  Id. at 26. 
 238.  Every state prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client’s crime or fraud and requires 
a lawyer to withdraw from any related representation when continued representation would 
assist a client’s crime or fraud.  Most states (37) permit, and four of them require, a lawyer 
to disclose confidential information to prevent a client’s criminal fraud.  Eighteen states 
permit a lawyer to disclose confidential information to rectify or mitigate a past client fraud.  
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 
1983) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSBILITY
Canon 7-102(A) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1980) (requiring a lawyer to not conceal, counsel, assist, 
or otherwise participate in a client’s illegal or fraudulent actions).  See also Roger C. 
Cramton et. al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley (Bos. U. Sch. of 
L. Working Paper No. 04-20, 2010), http://www.bu.edu/law/workingpapers-
archive/documents/koniak-et-al-sarbanes-oxley-04-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q22N-BYZG].  
239.  Failure to provide the report does not have a consequence on the status of the social 
purpose corporation.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.150(4) (West 2016) (“The failure 
to furnish to shareholders a social purpose report required by subsection (1) of this section 
does not affect the validity of any corporate action.”).
 240.  WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 3 (explaining that the reporting standards are 
designed to make it easier “for a consumer to tell the difference between a ‘good company’ 
and just good marketing.”); see also Reiser, supra note 3, at 684 (summarizing that the 
ultimate goal of social entrepreneurs who select a hybrid-entity form is brand recognition). 
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company.241  “Many of the few [benefit] reports that are currently available 
are self-promotional and do not provide much value to a reader looking for 
a full, fair evaluation of the business.”242  Often the reports that have been 
produced are not comprehensive and focus on reporting quantifiable 
aspects of the mission impact and not the overall performance of the 
company as stated in the Model or SPC statutes.  If hybrid corporations 
regularly produce annual benefit reports with little substance and marketing 
puffery, it is unlikely that these benefit reports will contribute significantly 
to the sector.243
Suggestions to improve the benefit reports have included providing 
more quantifiable data points like the “percentage of revenue donated to 
charities, hours per employee donated to charities, recycling per employee 
(in pounds), and percentage of employees paid a living wage.”244  But these 
reforms continue to focus on the benefit report as a marketing tool and do 
not transform the established perception of this requirement.  This narrow 
conception of benefit reports has not been sufficiently interrogated in social 
enterprise scholarship, and thus the sector has not embraced the generative 
power of the benefit reporting requirement. 
b. Founder perception of reporting as arduous and unnecessary 
The perceived costs of producing and distributing benefit reports is 
also a hurdle for social enterprise practitioners considering various forms of 
business entities.  If benefit reports do not create value for the social 
enterprise, then hybrid corporations are likely “to use the weakest [and less 
expensive] standard available [and] provide little to no useful information 
to the market, and waste company resources in the process.”245  Of the 
hybrid corporations in existence, empirical data suggests that the vast 
majority of them “are not complying with the statutory benefit reporting 
requirements,”246 perhaps the best indication of the relatively low priority 
social enterprise practitioners have placed on these reports.247  Corporate 
 241.  WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 20. 
 242.  Murray, supra note 24, at 360. 
 243.  Id. at 361.  “Reports alone provide little value if they fail to inform stakeholders or 
support a dialogue that influences the decisions and behaviour of both the reporting 
organization and its stakeholders.” SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES, GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE 9 (2002). 
 244.  Id. at 360. 
 245.  Id. at 361-62. 
 246.  An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 152, at 42. 
 247.  But see An Early Report on Benefit Reports supra note 152, at 43 (noting that the 
lack a reporting might also be due to the lacking of familiarity with benefit reporting 
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lawyers who understand the advantages of corporate reporting need to 
advise social enterprises at the entity formation stage about how the regular 
reports can engender good corporate governance.  Even if the founders 
decide not to incorporate the company as a hybrid corporation, they need to 
understand and be advised about including benefit reporting into the fabric 
of their social enterprise.  Corporate lawyers have the expertise and the 
opportunity, particularly at the entity formation stage, to explain to social 
enterprise practitioners the potential long-term impact of including benefit 
reporting as a self-regulatory governance tool. 
III. TOWARDS SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE
Federal regulations for enforcing and promoting good corporate 
governance are not readily applicable to the social enterprise sector.  Most 
social enterprises are either small for-profits not subject to federal 
regulation, or nonprofits with limited government oversight after entity 
formation.  Thus, it is not surprising that the social enterprise sector has not 
advanced new corporate governance models that accommodate the needs 
and complexity of the social enterprise ethos.  A self-regulatory reporting 
tool would not only strengthen an individual social enterprise’s governance 
practices, but the dissemination of these benefit reports would help 
establish governance norms tailored to the social enterprise sector.  Benefit 
reporting requirements provide a mechanism for social enterprises to reflect 
on and revise their corporate governance, which should strengthen their 
competitive advantage in the market place.  An important role for corporate 
lawyers is to advise social enterprises on the positive effects that benefit 
reporting could have as a governance mechanism and to draft the reports 
with the company.  Because social enterprises can exist in a variety of legal 
entities, there are a variety of corporate governance models that could be 
developed.  Legal counseling needs to explain why benefit reporting, as a 
foundational aspect of any social enterprise regardless of the legal form, 
promotes good governance and sustainability.  Corporate lawyers should 
refine their counsel on benefit reporting and social enterprise governance 
accordingly.
A. Improving Social Enterprise Governance through Reporting 
Social enterprises need practitioner-informed models of good 
corporate governance that allow them to balance their social mission and 
generally).
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commercial activities.  As outlined above, when understood in the context 
of new governance theory, benefit reporting practices can help social 
enterprises develop and maintain good corporate governance.  The benefit 
reporting requirements in hybrid-corporation statutes offer a mechanism for 
documenting, sharing, and refining social enterprise governance models, 
which are necessary for the long-term success of these companies.  Poor 
corporate governance affects performance and sustainability.  Good 
governance systems engender accountability, communication, 
commitment, and justice.248  Currently, the social enterprise sector does not 
have external oversight or market focuses that adequately encourage the 
development and refinement of best practices for social enterprise 
governance. 
Corporate lawyers can fill the gap between state facilitation of 
transfirm norms and practitioner expertise to develop social enterprise 
governance models.  Corporate lawyers understand the traditional corporate 
governance best practices and can play a vital role in implementing and 
designing new governance models unique to the social enterprise sector.  
Transactional lawyers have demonstrated that they “have the potential to 
add value in no small part by translating their clients’ and the government’s 
policy goals into the practical mechanisms of private ordering.”249
Corporate lawyers also are the conduits through which information within a 
sector moves between firms to help share lessons learned through 
experimentation.  For corporate lawyers to be effective in helping social 
enterprises develop innovative governance models, they should understand 
the benefit reporting process as an opportunity to critically reflect on and 
memorialize social enterprise governance practices.  Corporate lawyers 
would be instrumental in helping not only hybrid corporations understand 
the value of benefit reports through a new governance theoretical lens, but 
also in counseling all social enterprise entity forms on adopting benefit 
reporting as a self-regulatory mechanism. 
Hybrid corporations constitute only a portion of the social enterprise 
sector.  For benefit reporting to be transformative to the sector, all social 
enterprises, regardless of entity form, should incorporate regular benefit 
reporting as a fundamental component of the entity.  If benefit reports are 
encouraged and composed by corporate lawyers and informed by social 
enterprise practitioners’ experiences, then benefit reports have the potential 
to become an industry standard on which impact investors can rely for 
 248.  See Litowitz, supra note 89, at 526 (“The profit motive has always favored secrecy, 
but justice requires transparency.”). 
 249.  Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public-Private Transactions,
95 IOWA L. REV. 937, 943 (2009). 
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helpful information about the potential success of the social enterprise.  
This would further entrench the practice into the sector.  Once entrenched, 
benefit reporting will likely also be relied on by the sector and other 
stakeholders for informing governance practices in new and emerging 
social enterprises. 
A large part of corporate governance is creating systems of 
accountability so that directors can oversee managers, shareholders and 
donors can oversee the board, and the government can oversee the 
operations of the business.  Reporting and disclosure requirements have 
historically been the primary basis for regulators to create accountability 
and ensure that corporate governance is maintained within the company.250
Regular reporting requirements provide a systemic way to measure and 
monitor various levels of conduct and board oversight.  The process of 
preparing the report requires the company to review company decisions, 
finances, and purpose.  In this way, reporting promotes the development 
and strengthening of communication channels across the company’s key 
stakeholders, such as the board, managers, and owners or donors.  
Companies can often identify and resolve issues without mandated 
intervention from a regulating third-party if they take the self-reporting 
process seriously.  Self-regulation has often led “to greater levels of 
collaboration among firms, stakeholders, and policy groups on matters 
ranging from corporate best practices to market benchmarks and 
performance standards.”251  The engagement with corporate lawyers, 
consultants, and accountants to prepare the benefit reports would also 
highlight issues for management and the board’s consideration.  Reporting 
also allows the company to regularly refine its messaging, evaluate its 
progress, and adapt to changing environments.  For these reasons, benefit 
reporting can be an effective mechanism to ensure good social enterprise 
governance. 
Although empirical data establishes a relationship between the lack of 
corporate governance and poor financial performance, good corporate 
governance is not a panacea for business success.252  Nonetheless, it stands 
 250.  Hillary A. Sale, Banks: The Forgotten(?) Partners in Fraud, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
139, 139 (2004) (noting company reporting is “the chief method for cleansing fraud”). 
 251.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 803. 
 252.  Ben Emukufia Akpoyomare Oghojafor et al., Poor Corporate Governance and Its 
Consequences on the Nigerian Banking Sector, 5 SERB. J. MGMT. 243, 247 (2010).  
Generally, the link between good corporate governance and economic returns is thinly 
supported by empirical evidence. See e.g., Duc Hong Vo & Tri Minh Nguyen, The Impact 
of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance: Empirical Study in Vietnam, INT’L, J.
ECON. & FIN., June 2014, at 1 (examining empirical research on relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance in Vietnam); Tek Lama, Empirical Evidence on 
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to reason that the process of reflection through regular disclosures, with 
appropriate company action based on the information discovered through 
the reporting process, facilitates the long-term sustainability of the 
company.253  This is particularly important in the social enterprise sector 
where sustained social change is the touchstone for a successful company, 
rather than maximizing corporate profits.  Professors DiMaggio and Powell 
suggest that institutional pressures will lead organizations to model 
themselves upon established firms to garner legitimacy, a process they refer 
to as isomorphism.254  While formal pressures may originate from the 
government, the legal environment or important stakeholders (e.g., funders 
or partners), normative pressures, they argue, will lead organizations to 
adopting structures and practices based on norms and values promoted by 
successful institutional actors.255  As the social enterprises that regularly 
engage in benefit reporting establish themselves as market leaders, other 
social enterprises in the sector are likely to adopt the practice of reporting 
and documenting governance models to advance their social mission and 
help ensure a sustainable business. 
1. Criticisms of Mandatory Reporting Less Applicable to Benefit 
Reports
While annual reporting is a standard practice for public companies, 
regulatory reporting has not achieved the full impact of its potential to 
improve corporate governance.256  There are limitations on what regular 
the Link Between Compliance with Governance of Best Practice and Firms’ Operating 
Results, 6 AUSTL. ACCT. BUS. & FIN. J., no. 5, 2012, at 63 (examining 60 sample firms to 
establish the relationship between corporate governance and operating performance). But
see MARK HIRSCHEY ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 85 (1st ed. 
2009) (“Despite repeated attempts by academics to show an irrefutable link between 
[corporate governance and shareholder returns], the results are largely inconclusive.  Some 
empirical studies find important linkages between corporate governance and financial 
performance measures.  Yet, other research . . . reports mixed and often weak results.”). 
 253.  See Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An 
Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 
380-87 (2003) (discussing how most directors unconsciously make self-interested decisions, 
tend to be over-confident, and operate on cognitive dissonance). 
 254.  Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 
151 (1983) (identifying that “when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates 
symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations” that they 
perceive to be more legitimate and successful). 
 255.  Id.
 256.  Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 679 (2011) (“Mandated disclosure is not doomed to fail, but it rarely 
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reporting can be expected to achieve.  The following sections outline two 
of the major criticisms of mandatory, regulatory reporting requirements.  
This Article argues, however, that much of this criticism is less applicable 
to a voluntary benefit reporting process for social enterprises. 
a. Information overload not applicable to most social 
enterprises
One criticism is that companies simply focus on fulfilling the duty of 
disclosing rather than reporting information of any real substance.  In other 
words, although public companies may disclose the required information, 
too much is produced to be adequately scrutinized or questioned.  As others 
have explained, “[t]he explicit disclosure requirements of the federal 
securities laws are detailed and extensive, and the task public companies 
face in complying with the explicit disclosure requirements is daunting.”257
Moreover, large companies with substantial amounts of information have 
the ability to bury potentially questionable facts or accounting practices in 
intentionally large disclosures that no stakeholders have the time or energy 
to careful sift through.258  The quantity and “complexity of many 
[mandatory] disclosures, the innumeracy and illiteracy of many readers, 
and the burden of accumulating amounts of disclosure . . . [all] limit the 
effectiveness of [regulatory reporting requirements].”259  The ability for a 
succeeds . . . .  Rarely can each actor accomplish all that is needed, and therefore mandated 
disclosures rarely work as planned.”). 
 257.  Porter, supra note 67, at 2255. 
 258.  See Celia R. Taylor, Drowning in Disclosure: The Overburdening of Securities & 
Exchange Commission, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 85, 87 (2014) (referring to the SEC as “a 
disclosure dumping ground”); see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information 
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 433 
(2003) (discussing how disclosures will not protect investors or result in better decisions if 
investors cannot process all of the information, which can be too long, complex or buried 
within large disclosures). 
 259.  An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 152, at 37; see also Lin, supra note 
44, at 367-68 (adding that “the economic incentives do not properly encourage most 
individual investors to educate themselves by reading securities disclosures . . . .  Many 
institutional investors, for instance, are transient investors focused on quarterly or annual 
returns for their portfolio of numerous investments.  Therefore it makes little sense for them 
to engage in prolonged shareholder activism and monitoring, where they bear much of the 
costs of the fight, and their competitors can free-ride the benefits of their efforts.”); ARTHUR
LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: HOW TO FIGHT FOR YOUR FINANCIAL FUTURE 44 (2003) 
(explaining his frustration reading mutual fund prospectuses and coming to the conclusion 
they were “written in impenetrable legalese, by and for securities lawyers”); Steven
Davidoff Solomon, Corporate Governance Issues Grow More Complex, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 21, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/corporate-governance-
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board, and to a greater extent the federal government, to substantively 
monitor risks and provide oversight through a reporting process necessarily 
diminishes when applied to multinational institutions.260  However, there 
are few social enterprises currently in existence that compare in size or 
magnitude to the multinational institutions that have failed despite being 
subject to extensive reporting requirements.261  While there are significant 
social enterprises such as The Honest Company, Inc. or Revolutionary 
Foods,262 the vast majority of social enterprises tend to be smaller 
companies that, even with growth potential, are likely to remain privately-
held companies.  Thus, the quantity and complexity of information to be 
disclosed and reported would often be more manageable for social 
enterprises.
b. Increased access to justice minimizes the finanical costs 
Another major criticism of reporting requirements is that the expense 
of regulatory reporting outweighs the objectives of mandated disclosures.  
There is no doubt that the cost of regulatory reporting is significant for 
public companies.  Many of these costs are spent on corporate lawyers and 
accountants who are required to have specialized expertise on regulatory 
compliance across several evolving areas of law.  Maintaining systems of 
monitoring public companies is also time consuming and expensive for the 
federal government given that “[p]ublic corporations are extraordinarily 
intricate institutions that pursue complex, large-scale projects.”263  Public 
companies can “resemble political nation-states with multiple 
constituencies.”264  For this reason, it can take years before federal agencies 
detect and correct problems of poor corporate governance or other 
issues-grow-more-complex/ [https://perma.cc/A4GZ-2B29] (highlighting that even with 
robust reporting requirements there are still “boards like the one at Enron, which was highly 
rated for corporate governance but made foolish — and ultimately disastrous — decisions”). 
 260.  Aronson, supra note 58, at 131 (discussing the SEC’s systemic failure to regulate 
Enron as evidence by its lack of review of financial statements from 1997 to 2002, when the 
company collapsed). 
 261.  An example of a multinational social enterprise is Mondragon Corporation, Spain’s 
tenth largest business group with approximately 74,000 employees and cooperative owners.  
For more information see Mondragon Corporation, MONDRAGON, http://www.mondragon-
corporation.com/eng/ [https://perma.cc/DE27-GY7N] (last visited May 19, 2016). 
 262.  The Honest Company may be the first California social enterprise to have an initial 
public offering.  Douglas MacMillan & Rolfe Winkler, Jessica Alba’s Startup, Honest, 
Valued at $1.7 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/jessica-
albas-startup-honest-valued-at-1-7-billion-1439477917 [https://perma.cc/S7EE-WMAX].  
 263.  Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18, at 175. 
 264.  Id.
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misdeeds. 
Issues of extensive cost, however, are less applicable to benefit 
reporting because there are few requirements that control benefit reports of 
hybrid corporations, and benefit reporting by other entity forms would be 
self-regulated by the individual companies.  Moreover, pro bono corporate 
representation is an underutilized resource that social enterprises could use 
to offset the financial burdens of benefit reporting.  Many law firms 
provide pro bono representation to nonprofit entities.265  Nonprofit social 
enterprises within the applicable pro bono client guidelines should access 
pro bono corporate counsel to help draft the benefit reports.  Law firms 
should also be encouraged to provide access to pro bono services or 
deferred payment fee structures to for-profit social enterprises.  Although 
operating through a for-profit model, for-profit social enterprises often 
have limited financial bandwidth as profits are often reinvested back into 
advancing the social mission.  Their limited financial resources and focus 
on social mission make them analogous to nonprofit organizations and, 
thus, law firms should recognize them as eligible pro bono clients.  Pro 
bono options for corporate lawyers should be expanded to include for-
profit social enterprise in part because “business law pro bono still remains 
more of a potential than a realization.”266  However, even if a law firm does 
not include for-profit social enterprises in their pro bono policy, law firms 
could increase social enterprise access to corporate lawyers by 
implementing a per se deferred payment policy for for-profit social 
enterprises.  Under this fee structure, for example, payments could be 
deferred until the social enterprise closes a significant funding round or a 
liquidating transaction.  This is a common fee structure for start-up 
technology companies because law firms recognize that emerging 
companies need access to corporate lawyers and that investing preventative 
legal resources in early-stage companies can have significant financial 
returns.  Drafting MD&A sections and conducting diligence for benefit 
reports would be excellent training and exposure for junior associates who 
need to learn how to compose disclosure materials for their public company 
and private-equity clients.  Thus, providing pro bono or deferred payment 
representation to social enterprises would be advantageous for law firms as 
well as social enterprises.
 265.  Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 44 (2004) 
(“Referral organizations focused on linking transactional business lawyers with nonprofit 
and small for-profit organizational clients have gained increased attention within the pro 
bono system.”). 
 266.  James L. Baillie, Fulfilling the Promise of Business Law Pro Bono, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1543, 1563 (2002). 
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In addition to expanded pro bono and deferred payment policies at law 
firms, business law clinics should also include advising clients as they 
prepare benefit reports in their list of client services. With the drastic 
increase in business law clinics over the last decade,267 many law schools 
across the country now have the capacity to assist social enterprises 
compose regular benefit reports and assess their corporate governance 
practices in the process.268  A goal of many business law clinics is to not 
only prepare law students for the impending rigors of corporate practice, 
but also to close the access to justice gap for marginalized constituencies.  
Similar to junior associates at law firms working pro bono, law students in 
business law clinics would benefit from the experience of conducting 
diligence, composing benefit reports, and advising their social enterprise 
clients as they think critically about their current governance practices.   
Moreover, recognizing the impact that business law clinics could have in 
helping social enterprises develop governance models that address the 
complexities of their businesses, benefit reporting representation would be 
an appropriate client matter for these clinical programs to take on.  As a 
result of increased access to law firms and business law clinics, the relative 
financial burden of benefit reporting to social enterprises would be 
significantly less than the cost of compliance for public companies with 
intricate reporting requirements under SOX, Dodd-Frank, or other 
reporting required by the SEC. 
B. Impacts of Reporting on Social Enterprise Governance 
Promoting good social enterprise governance does not require 
expansion of federal or state oversight to small social enterprises, which 
could impede growth in the sector with the increased cost of government 
regulation.269  The innovation of benefit reports in hybrid-corporation 
267. See Jennifer Fan, Institutionalizing the USPTO Law School Clinic Certification 
Program for Transactional Law Clinics, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 327, 332 n. 14 (2015) 
(identifying 188 transactional law clinics as of August 1, 2014).  See also Jones and Lainez,
supra note 16, at 93 (noting that in 2013 there were more than 140 transactional clinics at 
just over 200 American Bar Association approved law schools, which is a 2700% increase 
over the 5 transactional clinics reported in 1992). 
268. See Alina S. Ball, Disruptive Pedagogy: Incorporating Critical Theory in Business 
Law Clinics, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. 701 (2015); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social 
Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215 (2013); Patience Crowder, Transactional Community 
Lawyering: Introducing Denver Law’s New Community Economic Development Clinic,
DEN. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-
onlinearticle/2011/4/22/transactional-community-lawyering-introducing-denver-laws-
ne.html [https://perma.cc/M3CR-UQRB].  
 269.  See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate 
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legislation has given the social enterprise sector a method for incorporating 
regular reporting into the fabric of the entity form to improve and track 
good governance practices.  The sector should broadly embrace the practice 
of regular reporting and support the development of good corporate 
governance that would flow from its implementation.  Even if benefit 
reporting is not adopted universally across all social enterprises, the 
reporting process would yield a positive impact to participating social 
enterprises and a net positive for the sector.  
The marketplace can be an effective compliance officer.270  The 
positive response from impact investors and donors, and the sustainability 
of the participating social enterprises, will determine whether benefit 
reporting takes hold as a transfirm norm within the social enterprise sector.  
Corporate lawyers are often characterized as gatekeepers, but they are also 
norm facilitators.271  Thus, the intimate involvement of corporate lawyers in 
the benefit reporting process is necessary to facilitate the positive 
outcomes, as outlined below, in the social enterprise sector.272
Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 59 (1992) (“The problem is not the system of laws, 
regulations, and judicial decisions which are the framework of corporate governance.”). 
270 See Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance: 
Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 229, 236 (2006) (arguing that companies “may have 
specific incentives to disclose their governance practices” to prevent “devaluation of the 
firm by the market” and the “network externalities that could occur if they do not adopt 
governance practice.”).
 271.  See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Guardians Adrift: The Social Anthropology of the 
Corporate Gatekeeper Professions, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 225, 262-63 (2007) 
(explaining that the law provides insight into a culture’s perceptions and norms); see also
Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher 
Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 333 (2006) (describing “lawyers working within 
organizations to use a capacity-building orientation simultaneously to advance core 
institutional values and to achieve compliance with the law.”); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & 
Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 68 (2003) (characterizing the Model Code of Professional Conduct 
as a “pronouncement of societal norms”); John Gerard Ruggie, Global Governance and 
“New Governance Theory”: Lessons from Business and Human Rights, 20 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 5, 14 
(Jan.-Mar. 2014) (explaining how the involvement of corporate lawyers in the development 
of the UN Human Right Council Guiding Principles had the cascading effect of “raising its 
visibility within companies to general counsel and even chief executive officer levels, rather 
than being confined to corporate social responsibility departments.”). 
 272.  See Lisa T. Alexander, supra note 235, at 741–42 (noting that while the role of 
lawyer remains underdeveloped in new governance scholarship, there is an emphasis on the 
need for collaborative lawyering). 
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1. Flexibility Engenders Organizational Buy-in 
One of the criticisms of externally imposed reporting requirements is 
the difficulty of assessing whether the company is simply fulfilling an 
imposed requirement or if there is a genuine culture of corporate 
governance that permeates the company.273  While institutional investors 
generally express support for corporate governance reforms, empirical 
evidence has shown that investors believe that “the most important point to 
emphasize is the maintenance of self-regulation.”274  A voluntary benefit 
reporting system as suggested in this Article allows for social enterprise 
directors and executives to make determinations about the reporting 
process and define the contours of the report so that the product and 
process are helpful for the company.  Executive and board participation in 
the design of the benefit reporting process could therefore engender the 
long-term engagement that is necessary to shift the culture towards 
prioritizing good corporate governance. 
2. Stakeholder Governance and Participatory Democracy 
As mentioned above, stakeholder engagement is what contributes to 
the foundationally distinct nature of social enterprise governance.  
Stakeholders are “[a]ny identifiable group or individual who can affect the 
achievement of an organization’s objectives, or who is affected by the 
achievement of an organization’s objective.”275  The participation of 
stakeholders in social enterprise governance is significant to the sector’s 
success because “stakeholders who feel included in the corporate decision-
making process demonstrate a higher level of emotional investment and 
commitment to the firm’s mission.”276  Participatory governance, which 
meaningfully engages stakeholders in resolving problems affecting them,277
is another component of social enterprise governance that makes it distinct 
 273.  See Ruth V. Aguilera, Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: An 
Institutional Comparative Perspective, 16 BRIT. J. MGMT. S39, S43 (2005) (“One of the 
problems with codes of good governance is that it is hard to assess whether or not codes are 
simply a box-ticking corporate governance tool decoupled from a transformation in the 
firm’s corporate governance culture.”). 
 274.  JILL SOLOMON & ARIS SOLOMON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
137 (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2004). 
 275.  R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New 
Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88, 91 (1983). 
 276.  Yockey, supra note 113, at 804. 
 277.  Lee, supra note 192, at 405 (“In recent decades, courts, legislatures, administrative 
agencies, and other institutions all have used participatory-governance approaches to tackle 
complex problems of law and public policy.”). 
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from traditional models of corporate governance.  Part of what makes 
stakeholder governance particularly difficult for social enterprises is that 
their key stakeholders are often members of marginalized populations.  
Recall the social enterprise case studies in Part I where stakeholders in 
social enterprise Number One included employees who were formerly 
incarcerated,278 and the stakeholders in social enterprise Number Two 
included individuals suffering from food insecurity.279  What makes social 
enterprises potentially revolutionary is the possibility that “marginalized 
stakeholders—those who traditionally have had little influence on matters 
of governance and who are subject to subordination under the systems 
under reform—can meaningfully participate in the process.”280  Often in 
practice, however, “marginalized stakeholders do not actually influence the 
outcome, the participatory process becomes merely ‘cosmetic’ and 
affirmatively subverts the good-governance aims that it is meant to 
achieve.”281  This is problematic because “[m]arginalized stakeholders are 
uniquely positioned to offer [social enterprises] information, perspectives, 
and ideas, as well as to serve as a check on more established actors who 
might otherwise use New Governance processes to further regulatory 
capture.”282
For these reasons, social enterprises need guidance and support to 
intentionally create governance models that can prioritize and manage 
relations with stakeholders, particularly the marginalized stakeholders they 
serve and seek to empower.283  “The normative foundation of the 
stakeholder-focused organization provides legitimacy for [the] existence” 
of social enterprises, as social enterprises are often “created by people who 
are closely linked with the community they intend to serve.”284  If social 
enterprises do not develop meaningful ways to engage marginalized 
stakeholders into their governance, it would not only undermine the 
legitimacy of individual businesses but also threaten the growth of the 
sector.285  The benefit reporting process can provide a contemplative 
 278.  See supra Part I.A.i. 
 279.  See supra Part I.A.ii. 
 280.  Lee, supra note 192, at 406. 
 281.  Id.
 282.  Id. at 409–10.
 283.  See Mason et. al., supra note 155, at 288 (“[G]overnance structures should 
facilitate managing the claims of the stakeholders they serve.”).  
 284.  Id. at 284. 
 285.  See Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons 
from Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
117, 174–76 (2009) (identifying how limited stakeholder participation contributed to the 
failures of HOPE VI in Chicago case studies).
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opportunity for the social enterprise to evaluate whether its current 
governance structure is accomplishing the goals of stakeholder governance.  
Once weaknesses in the governance structure are acknowledged, the social 
enterprise can work with its corporate lawyer to refine and revise its 
governance structure to address those weaknesses and improve the 
deliberative process when making decisions that invoke competing 
interests amongst stakeholders.     
3. Information Production 
Directors often lack sufficient information to make informed decisions 
and provide effective executive oversight.  Similarly, executives and 
managers benefit from having better access to information on the 
performance of the company.  Many of the widely accepted measures for 
improving corporate governance in small companies, such as clearly 
defined division of authority, organizational goals, and standards for review 
of executive performance,286 require the company to have access to 
information on its performance and documentation of lessons learned 
through its operation. 
Thus, the type and quality of information that social enterprises 
include in their benefit report can have a significant influence on improving 
the governance of the company.  To date, benefit reports have often 
focused on documenting quantifiable data without including a more 
comprehensive analysis of the company’s performance.  Moving forward, 
corporate lawyers should advise their social enterprise clients on the value 
of preparing benefit reports that also capture qualitative information on 
how the company is incorporating those lessons learned on corporate 
governance into the structure of the business.  This information would 
become more valuable as it builds on lessons learned in the previous years.  
The benefit reports could, for example, highlight changes from the previous 
year’s benefit report whenever possible to save the company time in 
preparing the report and save the investors’ and stakeholders’ time in 
reviewing the report.  This approach would not only give the reader a 
chance to compare different organizations in the field but also better 
evaluate the progress of the social enterprise over time. 
4. Refine Board Composition 
One of the attributes of regular reporting on corporate governance is 
 286.  See supra Part I.B.ii.
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that the process of gathering information and reviewing it with the board 
provides the directors an opportunity to self-reflect and to determine 
whether the board’s current composition is appropriate for the needs of the 
company.  Social enterprises that develop models for incorporating 
stakeholder participation become better at collecting information on the 
company, which will likely influence how directors make decisions about 
who serves on the board.  The process of reporting can also encourage 
boards to address whether additional expertise is needed in the boardroom 
to provide the company with better oversight.  The board of any social 
enterprise should have a mixture of functional skills and access to 
information on how to assess the company’s social impact as well as 
evaluate the market-based strategies.  Successful boards will want to 
foresee where the company is headed in the future and have individuals 
with the appropriate expertise on the board to help the company move 
forward in strategic directions. There is a relationship between board 
composition and firm performance.287  Social enterprise boards must 
therefore engage in strategic planning about their composition.  In addition 
to reviewing the characteristics and contributions of individual directors, 
the benefit report would provide social enterprise boards an opportunity to 
evaluate its effectiveness in providing the executives and managers with 
sufficient oversight and guidance.288  This reflection and evaluation is not 
likely to occur in the social enterprise sector without the information 
produced and reviewed during a regular reporting process. 
C. Implementing Benefit Reporting Across Entity Form 
A social enterprise can elect when to engage in a reporting process; 
but if it is not a fundamental aspect of the company identity, other activities 
will likely arise that are more urgent, but not more important, than regular 
reporting.  Thus, corporate lawyers advising and counseling social 
enterprise clients on how to bake benefit reporting and accountability into 
the fabric of the entity form is a necessary component of advancing social 
enterprise governance. 
 287.   See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: 
How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 395 (2014) (noting 
that female directors and directors of color have different life experiences that allows for 
them to bring “a wider range of options and solutions to corporate issues”) (quoting Lisa M. 
Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued 
Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 590 (2006)). 
 288.  See JOHN L. WARD, CREATING EFFECTIVE BOARDS FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 3-4 
(1991) (explaining that the board serves as a sparring partner for the company executives to 
test their strengths and weaknesses before products and ideas reach the marketplace). 
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1. Organizational Documents 
In drafting organizational documents for a social enterprise, corporate 
lawyers should advise their clients to consider integrating regular reporting 
that is analogous to the benefit reporting requirements for hybrid 
corporations.  Reporting requirements can be included in the bylaws of a 
corporation or the operating agreement of a LLC, or a company policy.  
Corporate lawyers should also advise their social enterprise clients on the 
value of establishing a benefit officer289 position as an effective way of 
maintaining this self-regulatory process.  Some audit committees, for 
example, have strengthened the evaluation and replacement of a 
corporation’s independent auditor.  In similar fashion, a benefit officer 
position designates an individual to ensure that the social enterprise 
engages in the reporting process in a thoughtful and consistent manner. 
CONCLUSION
The social enterprise movement is still in its infancy and has yet to 
develop governance practices and models that account for the complexity 
of this sector.  This dearth of social enterprise governance models is 
problematic given the complications of the competing interests within each 
social enterprise.  The hybrid-corporation statutes address this current 
vacuum in social enterprise governance by providing benefit reporting as a 
mechanism to document, disseminate, and refine good governance 
practices.  These new corporate law statutes should be viewed as norm 
creating vehicles; as benefit reporting can play an important role as a 
governance mechanism within the social enterprise sector.  Benefit 
reporting cannot be transformative if only marginally adopted by the 
limited number of hybrid corporations currently in existence.  Thus, all 
social enterprises, regardless of entity form, should take advantage of 
regular benefit reporting to hone their corporate narrative and develop 
appropriate stakeholder governance models.  Corporate lawyers can serve 
an important function in advancing social enterprise governance by 
advising their clients how to integrate into the foundation of the company a 
benefit reporting system and participating in the report drafting process. 
The process of regular benefit reporting would facilitate the 
establishment of governance models unique to the social enterprise sector.  
The knowledge and participation of social enterprise practitioners is critical 
 289.  See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 304 (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016) (defining functions 
of a benefit officer). 
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to the success of this new governance experiment to promote social 
enterprise governance.  Thus, corporate lawyers will need to work 
collaboratively with social enterprise executives to design and implement 
benefit reporting processes.  The contributions and expertise of corporate 
lawyers in developing good social enterprise governance can lead to more 
sustainable social enterprises, which would ultimately foster a more 
equitable and inclusive economy. 
